Nuclear Security & Deterrence Vol. 19 No. 38
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Nuclear Security & Deterrence Monitor
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October 09, 2015

Y-12 Storage of Hazardous Materials Under Scrutiny

By Alissa Tabirian

Staff Reports
NS&D Monitor
10/9/2015

A series of issues involving bulging drums and related problems have prompted standing orders, corrective actions, and increased scrutiny of some of the storage of hazardous materials at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant in Oak Ridge.

Periodic issues with waste or storage drums are not that uncommon, but it appears there have been a number of unusual events and an unusual number of them, according to recently released reports by Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board staff and occurrence reports filed by the Y-12 managing contractor, Consolidated Nuclear Security.

Of note was a recent safety board report that revealed concerns about stored materials associated with dismantlement activities at the nuclear weapons plant’s Beta-2E facility – which is the Y-12 hub for assembly and disassembly operations.

The issues generally involved drums that were loaded at Beta-2E and transferred to Building 9720-5, a high-security warehouse that once was the plant’s primary storehouse for weapon-grade uranium, before the Highly Enriched Uranium Material Facility came online in 2010-2011. The events were reportedly the subject of a critique held by CNS to brief senior managers.

The staff report to DNFSB headquarters, for the week ending Aug. 28, indicated some issues were initially raised in late July about the documentation associated with drums that had been transferred to the warehouse. A shift technical adviser with Y-12’s Special Nuclear Materials Operations “determined that the documentation supporting drums transferred to Building 9720-5 did not have enough information to determine if the materials in drums were below safety basis maximum allowable quantities (MAQ)” for that building.

Several days later, according to the report, another issue came up when a shipment of drums arrived from Beta-2E. Six of those drums weighed less than what was indicated on the shipping document, potentially raising a concern about the in-house tracking of special nuclear material. This incident apparently happened the same month as a recently confirmed incident in which Y-12 shipped more uranium than intended to an off-site location, reportedly violating Department of Transportation regulations and raising other issues.

Following the concern raised about drums shipped from Beta-2E, the Special Nuclear Materials Operations manager suspended acceptance of drums from the dismantlement activities, the report stated.

Next, SNMO personnel discovered on Aug. 10 a “bulged and hissing drum” in a separate group of drums stored at Building 9720-5. Those drums had been loaded at Beta-2E prior to 2012 and had been stored in the Building 9720-5 warehouse while awaiting final disposition, the DNFSB staff report said.

Again, Consolidated Nuclear Security responded with a number of measures. An occurrence report prepared by the contractor said officials opted to puncture certain “suspect drums” that had been packed and in storage since before 2012. This was done as a precaution to ensure conditions weren’t rip for other drums to become pressurized, and about 60 drums were reportedly repacked to meet requirements.

Meanwhile, the safety board staff also noted that Y-12’s plant shift superintendent had authorized an emergency campaign to address the discovery of several pressurized drums in Building 9215, one of the plant’s uranium facilities. During the effort to vent those drums, the Y-12 Fire Department personnel were sprayed with what the report described as a “viscous” material. The employees were wearing HAZMAT suits and respirators, and a survey indicated that – after the suits were removed – none of the workers had been contaminated with radioactive materials.

The problems with the pressurized drums had to do with their waste origins. Waste management and production workers had previously filled about 20 of the 55-gallon drums with liquid from a tank once used to collect waste liquids, such as hydraulic fluids, mop water and oil and water associated with depleted uranium operations. These liquids had been stored in the tank for more than five years, and they were being emptied into the drums to allow some old operations at Building 9215 to resume.

According to the safety board memo, even before the transfer waste workers had noted some “biological growth” on the surface of the liquids, and some of the material had “formed into a thick sludge.” Because of the abnormal conditions, the workers – after filling the drums and placing lids on them – used “expansion vent plugs” and “loose bung plugs” to help ensure that gases could be vented if necessary. However, at least one of those drums was found to be bulged, and others had “abnormal indications,” the report stated.

CNS subsequently took steps to properly vent the remaining drums, also issuing a standing order to restrict similar work until further review.

Contractor spokeswoman Ellen Boatner said the final occurrence report for the 9215 drum problems has not been released. However, she said the incident did not result in any injuries or contamination of workers. She also said there were no hazardous releases to the environment.

 

 

 

 

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