Staff Reports
NS&D Monitor
10/23/2015
Consolidated Nuclear Security, the government’s managing contractor for the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant in Oak Ridge, has paid a total of $33,620 in fines for violation of Department of Transportation regulations during a July 13 shipment of highly enriched uranium.
Documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act revealed that the shipment from Y-12 to Mirion Technologies Corp. in Horseheads, N.Y., contained a kilogram of weapon-grade uranium – more than 93 percent U-235. That’s 10 times the intended amount of highly enriched uranium (100 grams), and the packaging labels did not reflect the actual shipping load, which apparently arrived in a container unsuited for that quantity of fissile material.
In response to questions earlier this fall, the National Nuclear Security Administration had acknowledged a shipping error involving Y-12 and “special nuclear material,” but the semiautonomous federal subagency of the Department of Energy had refused to specify the amount or type of material or confirm where the shipment went.
There are still many lingering questions regarding the flawed shipment of nearly pure U-235, which was in a metal form when shipped hundreds of miles via commercial carrier.
The DOT cited the Y-12 contractor for two violations: (1) offering or accepting a hazardous material for transportation that is not properly classed, described, packaged, marked, labeled, or in proper condition for shipment; and (2) failing to retrain hazardous material employees every three years.
Documents released by the Department of Transportation indicate that a chemical operator who placed the uranium into packages at Y-12 did not have sufficient or timely training for the task associated with the shipping of highly enriched uranium.
Darrell Graddy, Consolidated Nuclear Security’s vice president for mission support, said human error was the direct cause of the shipping mix-up. In an Aug. 31 letter to Joseph Gubino, a DOT agent involved in the investigation of the event, Graddy wrote: “Personnel mistakenly placed more material into the containers than was intended. Once the discrepancy between the amounts listed on the container labels was identified, personnel changed the labels without verifying the amounts (inside the packages).”
The Criticality Safety Index (CSI) and the Transportation Index (TI) — safety controls for the shipment of radioactive materials – did not reflect the actual contents of the packages, thus “resulting in illegal shipment of radioactive material,” the DOT said.
In correspondence with the DOT, Graddy said the Y-12 contractor has made changes to prevent a recurrence. Those include altering the “workflow software” used on the shop floor at Y-12 so that if an operator changed the weight in the system to match the packing instructions, the software “will flag the difference.” Graddy also said CNS had implemented a standing order to restrict work on transportation projects to only those employees properly trained for shipment of hazardous materials.
The mischaracterization of what was inside the packages of fissile uranium apparently prompted the use of the wrong containers for shipping the uranium from Y-12 to Mirion three months ago. The DOT documents indicate that two 5-gallon “Type A” drums were used to ship the highly enriched uranium, which was a Class 7 radioactive material, to the private facility in New York. Each drum reportedly had a maximum limit of 60 grams of U-235, but the actual amounts shipped in the containers were 460 grams in one and 540 grams in the other.
Those amounts were confirmed in an Aug. 24 email from James D. Cunningham, the transportation and traffic manager at Y-12, to Gubino.
Once the problem was discovered at the New York facility, a special team from Y-12 arrived to repackage the materials — using a Type B container – for the return shipment to Oak Ridge.
Ellen Boatner, a spokeswoman at Y-12, said Consolidated Nuclear Security paid the Department of Transportation fines, although she did not specify the amount of money involved.
“Y-12 representatives have been in contact with DOT and have cooperated with their findings and paid any fines,” Boatner said. “Corrective actions have been identified and have been implemented to ensure full compliance for all Y-12 shipments.”
In response to questions, Seth B. Rosen, Mirion’s executive vice president and general counsel, said his company followed procedures throughout the event and was not at fault.
“When the shipment was received and opened in July 2015, Mirion noted that the contents did not conform with its order,” Rosen said via email. “Consistent with all applicable policies and procedures, Mirion immediately notified the government agency that fulfilled the order (Y-12 National Security Complex) and U.S. Department of Energy NNSA personnel retrieved the non-conforming shipment the following day.”
Mirion “operated in full compliance with all laws and regulations,” Rosen said. He also said there was never any health hazard to Mirion employees or the general public.
According to Rosen, the company ordered the HEU from Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s National Isotope Development Center. He said the materials were for “commercial use in civilian nuclear power plants.”
