Brian Bradley
NS&D Monitor
09/18/2015
Consolidated Nuclear Security has implemented or is in the process of implementing six of seven self-identified recommendations, a process that has been observed by Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board’s site reps after the company’s Y-12 site manager in May recognized potential operational problems at the nuclear weapons site, according to CNS spokeswoman Ellen Boatner.
CNS has implemented daily senior supervisory watches, assigning personnel from “Production’s Action Office” to enhance oversight at Building 9212’s Material Access Area, and provides information from the observations to Production Office management daily. Additionally, CNS is establishing a mission assurance organization to conduct a systems review of specific work processes, Boatner said. CNS is also in the planning stages of (1) accelerating use of performance management teams to stimulate work crew self-evaluations and performance improvements; (2) implementing a two-week “stand down” process that allows work groups to review practices and procedures, and do housekeeping and other training to improve disciplined operations; and (3) initiating a “site academy” in which select personnel receive a month of training intended to provide tools to become “standard-bearers” for disciplined operations for their work groups, according to the spokeswoman. Implementation of these three recommendations is on track, she said. CNS did not say whether it has yet implemented its recommendation to assign a senior operations manager to help 9212 managers and supervisors with conduct of operations mentoring.
An Aug. 21 DNFSB site representative report noted that a two-month CNS review revealed indications of “organizational drift” that appeared during the 2014 transition of management of Y-12 and the Pantex Plant from B&W to CNS. DNFSB Oak Ridge site representatives William Linzau and Rory Rauch in their report wrote that the drift stemmed from “the fast pace and magnitude of change, unclear roles and responsibilities, and an uneven flow of information throughout the organization,” which contributed to unidentified ConOps issues at the plant. According to the letter, in late August, the site reps observed an Action Office representative conducting enhanced oversight in Building 9212, in accordance with one of the recommendations.
“The team concluded that this organizational drift was removing the focus from work and reducing the workforce’s sense of formality and ownership,” the report states. “The team found that an adequate number of layers of protection, or barriers, existed for most of these events, but the events ultimately occurred due to human performance errors that bypassed these barriers.”
