Staff Reports
NS&D Monitor
1/29/2016
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has cited the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tenn., for a violation involving the improper export of uranium to Jamaica as part of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s nonproliferation program.
According to the notice of violation, the shipment of low-enriched uranium to Jamaica last September included Canadian-origin uranium, and the Oak Ridge plant – which is the nation’s main repository for weapon-grade uranium – is not allowed to export non-U.S. nuclear materials unless specifically requested in advance of the shipment and authorized by the NRC.
Y-12 reportedly did not ask for or receive NRC approval and did not have the necessary permission from the Canadian government.
“We do not have any comment at this time,” Steven Wyatt, a spokesman for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Production Office, said in an email response to questions.
Y-12 is required to prepare a response to NRC’s notification.
The alleged violation involves one of the NNSA’s celebrated successes in nonproliferation during the Obama administration. The low-enriched uranium (just under 20 percent U-235) was shipped to Jamaica last September for use as fuel in the SLOWPOKE (Safe Low-Power Kritical Experiment) research reactor, which had been converted from its previous use of highly enriched uranium. Converting research reactors has been a point of emphasis in the NNSA’s program to reduce the threat of weapon-making materials getting into the hands of terrorists or rogue states.
Tom Clements, an activist with Savannah River Watch in South Carolina, said the good news is that the SLOWPOKE reactor was converted to use low-enriched uranium, but he said the NRC’s action should serve as a wake-up call about how the NNSA is carrying out its activities.
“Unauthorized export of Canadian-origin LEU from Y-12 is of concern as the NNSA has ignored regulations concerning consent rights over foreign obligated nuclear materials,” Clements said. “The violation cited by the NRC should prompt more in-depth reviews of all NNSA export licenses involving both HEU and LEU from Y-12.”
Earlier reports indicated that new fuel for SLOWPOKE would be produced in Canada using U.S. uranium. But the fuel apparently included uranium from both the U.S. and Canada, although it wasn’t immediately clear why.
In a Sept. 22, 2015 news release, the National Nuclear Security Administration noted that the conversion of fuels for SLOWPOKE was an important milestone, “making the Caribbean region completely free of HEU.”
The research reactor at the University of West Indies in Kingston, Jamaica, is used for a variety of purposes, such as neutron-activation analysis that bombards materials with neutrons, enabling scientists to determine the chemical elements and other key information.
The NNSA has been pushing conversion of formerly HEU-fueled research reactors as a part of the nonproliferation efforts around the world. Generally, the new fuel is slightly below 20 percent U-235, which is an important point that reduces the weapons potential.
Y-12’s original export license application indicated the shipment to Jamaica would contain about 6.62 kilograms of uranium, with an enrichment level of 19.95 percent. The Oak Ridge plant asked for approval of the license on an accelerated basis. The shipment was to include a maximum of 225 fuel pins in the form of uranium dioxide fuel with zircalloy-4 cladding.
Nick Hilton, chief of NRC’s Enforcement Branch, notified the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Oak Ridge office of the violation in a Jan. 14 letter to Becky Eddy, who is on the staff of the NNSA’s Production Office at Y-12.
“Based on its review, the NRC has determined that a Severity Level IV violation of NRC requirements occurred,” Hilton wrote to Eddy. Level IV is a low-level citation, and there was no immediate indication that Y-12 will face fines or other penalties.
The NRC letter indicated that Y-12 “had prior opportunities to identify the limitations placed on its export licensed and failed to take action that would have prevented the violation.”
Y-12 apparently knew the material that was manufactured into fuel had Canadian “obligations” but did not inform the NRC before the export license was issued.
