Brian Bradley
NS&D Monitor
7/10/2015
Renewing the 30-year-old U.S.-China civil nuclear agreement would allow bilateral nuclear supply partnerships if China becomes a larger nuclear supplier, Tom Countryman, State Department Assistant Secretary of International Security and Nonproliferation, stated in Congressional testimony submitted on Wednesday. “These export opportunities could support tens of thousands of high-paying American jobs,” Countryman said in his testimony. “For all of these reasons, the U.S. nuclear industry strongly supports the agreement.” Countryman submitted the written testimony prior to a planned Wednesday hearing that would have seated members of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittees on Asia and the Pacific, and Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade. Ongoing votes prompted lawmakers to postpone the hearing to July 16.
Expedited Transfer Requests?
NNSA Administrator Frank Klotz stated in written testimony that the 123 agreement could help expedite technology transfer requests, which could aid in boosting American industry competition in the Chinese market. “As compared to the current regulatory pathway, this method would provide for greater oversight of all the covered activities, and would allow for more timely decisions regarding technology transfer requests so that U.S. companies may be increasingly competitive in the Chinese market,” Klotz stated. “It would also make the failure to comply with the technology transfer authorizations issued under the 123 Agreement a breach of the legally binding terms of the Agreement.” The agreement expires at the end of this year.
Will China Keep Exporting Reactor Tech to Pakistan?
Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee voiced concerns about the pending agreement during a May hearing, speaking about possible Chinese intentions to provide nuclear technology to other countries and using uranium enrichment to gain a military advantage. U.S. officials and academic experts have said China’s questionable Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) record has involved its continued nuclear supply to Pakistan, where it plans to send five to eight more power reactors, according to testimony submitted by Sharon Squassoni, Director and Senior Fellow of the Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “China’s NSG record has been marred by its continued nuclear supply to Pakistan, a country that does not qualify for exports since the NSG adopted the requirement for full-scope safeguards in 1992,” her testimony states. “Although some contracts were grandfathered when China joined the NSG in 2004…China is taking a rather expansive interpretation of these exceptions.”
Will China Re-Export U.S. Tech to Other Countries?
Rep. Matt Salmon (R-Utah), Chair of the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee, stated in submitted testimony his concerns that Chinese firms could eventually build reactor technology obtained through transfers from Westinghouse, before passing the technology to other countries. Westinghouse in 2007 sold four nuclear reactors to China. China has the fastest growing nuclear energy program in the world, and is currently operating 27 plants and building 24 more. China announced in December that it plans to spend about $11.2 billion annually on reactor construction until 2023. Salmon also expressed interest in hearing how jobs could be secured for American workers while limiting what he called “technology-transfer provisions in the contract that would reduce U.S. participation in Chinese nuclear projects over time.”
‘Eyes Wide Open’
The U.S. should renew the deal but approach implementation with “eyes wide open,” as suspicions of Chinese diversion of Westinghouse AP 1000 canned coolant pump technology to its submarine reactor program persist, Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, stated in written testimony. Sokolski called for “case-by-case authorizations” for each Chinese reprocessing campaign, and for the Director of National Intelligence to be transparent about Chinese nuclear actions. “Congress should also require our intelligence community produce a routine assessment of how Beijing might exploit its own civilian nuclear infrastructure and American nuclear technology for military purposes, and what might drive its future military nuclear requirements,” Sokolski stated.
