FPU for Cruise Missile Warhead Required in 2025 According to Compromise Bill
Todd Jacobson
NS&D Monitor
12/5/2014
House and Senate authorizers have agreed to language in the recently completed compromise version of the Fiscal Year 2015 Defense Authorization Act that would require a First Production Unit be completed on a new air-launched nuclear cruise missile warhead by 2025, reversing plans by the Administration to delay the warhead until 2027. House and Senate authorizers this week wrapped up work on the annual defense policy bill, with the House approving the bill Dec. 4. The Senate is expected to take up the legislation next week. Overall, the bill authorizes $8.2 billion for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s weapons program, $104.3 million less than the Administration’s $8.3 billion request for the program, but several provisions in the bill are aimed at accelerating modernization work across the weapons complex.
Most notably, language in the bill would move up the completion of a First Production Unit (FPU) on the Long-Range Standoff Weapon, or cruise missile warhead, adhering to language that was originally drafted by the House Armed Services Committee earlier this year. Senate authorizers added language that would allow the FPU to be delayed until 2026 with the approval of U.S. Strategic Command. The Administration earlier this year delayed the FPU for the cruise missile warhead program from 2024 to 2027 due to budget concerns, and it voiced concerns this summer about plans to accelerate the program.
According to the language, a FPU must be completed by Sept. 30, 2025, unless the commander of U.S. Strategic Command certifies that a one-year delay “is in the interest of national security and does not negatively affect the ability of the Commander to meet nuclear assurance and deterrence requirements.”
Bill Establishes 2027 Deadline for Pit Demonstration Capability
The bill also requires that the National Nuclear Security Administration develop the capability to produce 80 plutonium pits per year in a pilot demonstration program by 2027. The provision was a major issue pushed by the House Armed Services Committee, and Senate authorizers softened the language slightly in the compromise bill, providing an out for DOE and DoD to delay the 2027 deadline by two years if they provide a report to Congress “describing the justification for the proposed delay, the impacts of the proposed delay on stockpile stewardship, nuclear modernization, life extension programs, future stockpile strategy, and dismantlement efforts, as well as their assessment regarding whether the delay is consistent with national policy regarding creation of a responsive nuclear infrastructure.” StratCom would also be required to assert that the delay is in the best interest of the country.
According to the bill, the NNSA is required to produce qualified plutonium pits starting in 2021, with production of at least 10 war reserve pits in 2024, 20 war reserve pits in 2025, and 30 war reserve pits in 2026. The bill also attempts to shine a close eye on the production of uranium secondaries, requiring a report on the requirements for producing 50 to 80 secondaries a year and an analysis of whether any changes are needed to the production requirement.
New START Limitations Stripped From Bill
The compromise bill also drops a House-authored provision that would have prevented the Pentagon from spending money in FY 2015 to implement the New START Treaty over concerns about Russian actions in Ukraine and its violations of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, replacing it with a requirement for the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide why New START is in the interest of the United States. However, the bill requires the President to submit to Congress 90 days after the bill is enacted into law a report on Russian non-compliance with the INF Treaty. The Department of State and Department of Defense would also be required to update Congress every six months on Russian compliance with the treaty, and the President would be required to notify Congress of plans to respond to Russian deployment of any weapons systems that violate the treaty.
Additional NNSA Weapons Program Transfer Authority Given to DoD
While the bill authorizes a $104.3 million cut to funding for the weapons program, the legislation provides authority for the Department of Defense to continue transferring funds to bolster the agency’s weapons program and naval reactors account. Under the provision, the Secretary of Defense would be allowed to transfer up to $150 million to the nuclear weapons program or naval reactors account if the funding authorized or made available to NNSA’s weapons program is less than $8.7 billion.
The Congressional Budget Office would also be required to review 10-year cost estimates for modernizing the nation’s nuclear deterrent every two years. A House-passed provision would have required the CBO to review the nuclear modernization cost estimates every year, though the CBO director is required to send a letter to Congress if there is enough change in nuclear modernization plans to necessitate a report in off years.
Authorizers Take Aim at Rising Costs of Modernization
With an eye on the rising costs of modernization, the bill expands the requirement for independent cost review on NNSA life extension programs and infrastructure projects. The legislation requires an independent cost review at the completion of the 6.2 phase of the project, softening language in the House version of the bill that would have required a more extensive independent cost estimate at that point of project development. “We believe that, in the early stages of concept definition, there are often many options still under consideration and it would not be cost effective to perform a full independent cost estimate for each option,” lawmakers said in a joint explanatory statement accompanying the bill. “A less formal independent cost review at phase 6.2 has been determined to give sufficient cost guidance to determine which options should proceed further in the acquisition process.”
Lawmakers also will require the NNSA to examine using other facilities around the weapons complex to meet its plutonium strategy. Currently, the agency is planning to use existing facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratories as well as newly constructed “modules” to meet the nation’s plutonium needs after the cancellation of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear Facility, but the bill would require the NNSA to look beyond Los Alamos to see if it’s prudent to use other facilities around the weapons complex to help meet the nation’s plutonium needs.
The NNSA also would be required to provide life-cycle cost estimates for limited-life, single-purpose projects that have completed design and are expected to cost more than $100 million. That would include the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility being built at the Savannah River Site and the Waste Treatment Plant being built at the Hanford Reservation, but not the Uranium Processing Facility planned for the Y-12 National Security Complex. “We believe this provision will help reduce the likelihood of large and unexpected increases in lifecycle cost estimates late in the acquisition process for these types of facilities,” lawmakers said in the joint explanatory statement.
The bill also limits the number of NNSA headquarters employees to 1,690, a slight compromise from language in the House-passed version of the bill that would have limited employees within the Office of the NNSA Administrator to 1,650.
