March 17, 2014

UPF PROJECT PLANNING DOCUMENTS OUTLINED

By ExchangeMonitor

Project officials on the Uranium Processing Facility are planning to submit a design package for the massive construction effort by October of 2014 and begin construction in October of 2015, according to a recent report by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. In its Aug. 23 site representative report, which was released this week, the DNFSB said the NNSA authorized Y-12 National Security Complex contractor B&W Y-12 in August to continue pursuing the Critical Decision schedule, combining the CD-2 (establishing a performance baseline) and CD-3 (start of construction), despite an Independent Peer Review report that raised questions about management of the project and the readiness level of key technologies planned for the facility. According to the DNFSB report, the NNSA in July told B&W Y-12 to develop an alternate Critical Decision strategy that would account for the delayed Y-12/Pantex M&O procurement, directing that the plan complete work that would not be impacted by the contract transition by Sept. 30, 2013, without submitted a complete CD-2 performance baseline.

The NNSA did not respond to a request for comment on its plans, but the DNFSB said the IPR report suggested that lingering delays in transition to a new management and operating contractor at the plant was the biggest risk to the project’s schedule. “The team believes it is critical that the new contractor takes ownership of the baseline,” the DNFSB said. Uranium processing technologies that will be used in the facility have been previously highlighted as concerns, and the review team noted that some of the technologies are not mature enough to establish the project baseline, though it did not name the technologies. “The team recommended additional demonstrations that they believed would mature these technologies to an acceptable level,” the DNFSB said. The review team also raised concerns that the latest revision of the project’s Preliminary Safety Design Report would not be consistent with its design evolution at CD-2, and it urged project officials to update the Safety Design Strategy to reflect what is needed at CD-2.

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