Todd Jacobson
NS&D Monitor
1/16/2015
The Union of Concerned Scientists is continuing its opposition to the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, recommending in a report released this week that the controversial project be abandoned in favor of less expensive options. The report, “Excess Plutonium Disposition,” was authored by UCS physicist Edwin Lyman and urges NNSA to more strongly consider “immobilizing” plutonium that was slated to be processed in MOX or downblending it.
The Obama Administration proposed putting the MOX project on cold standby last year due to rising cost estimates and analyzed a handful of options, including immobilization and downblending. The NNSA study revealed that estimated construction costs for the facility had risen to $10 billion, up from a previous estimate of $7.7 billion and an earlier baseline of $4.86 billion. A more detailed follow-on study is ongoing. “The Department of Energy has already wasted billions on this risky boondoggle,” Lyman said. “It’s time to pursue cheaper, safer alternatives.”
UCS: MOX has ‘Veered Off the Wrong Track’
The UCS report draws on the conclusions of a previously unreleased 2006 Department of Energy study on disposition options for 13 metric tons of plutonium deemed unsuitable for MOX. That study suggests can-in-canister immobilization, where plutonium is fashioned into hockey puck-sized ceramic discs and surrounded by vitrified high-level waste, is the best option for that material, which is different than 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium currently slated to go through MOX. “Immobilization had the potential to be faster and cheaper than MOX,” Lyman said. “However, in order for immobilization to be a viable option today, the DOE would have to invest heavily in its development to make up for lost time.”
Several other downblending options would also be quicker and cheaper than immobilization, Lyman said. Downblending, however, would rely on permanent storage at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, which remains closed until at least 2016, when it is slated to partially open after a radiological release in February. “The MOX program has veered off on the wrong track,” Lyman said. “Immobilization or downblending are the only technologies clearly capable of handling the bulk of the current and projected future inventories of excess plutonium. The DOE should explore the full range of options before making a decision and revising its disposition plan.”
In a statement, NNSA spokesman Derrick Robinson said the agency was still reviewing plans for Fiscal Year 2015. He said as of November 2014, the project was about 50 percent complete and had spent $4.2 billion. “The department continues to review execution plans for FY 2015 work submitted by the MOX contractor at various funding levels and will determine the best path forward taking into account direction from Congress,” the agency said.
Taking Another Look at Options
In its report last year, the NNSA said the lifecycle cost estimate for immobilization was $28.65 billion and the total cost for downblending and disposal was $8.78 billion. The remaining costs for MOX, including construction and lifecycle costs, are $25.12 billion, the report said. The report largely dismissed immobilization and downblending, but Lyman said the agency did not look hard enough at those options. He said one obstacle to immobilization cited in the report, a shortage of high-level radioactive waste at the Savannah River Site to immobilize all 34 metric tons of MOX-bound plutonium, could be solved by using cesium-137 that had been planned to be vitrified in the Defense Waste Processing Facility. If DOE lowered the acceptable dose rate for the radiation barrier, the existing supply of cesium-137 could be stretched as well.
The NNSA could also dispose of more plutonium at WIPP than its report contemplated, lessening the impact on the disposal volume at the repository, according to Lyman. The NNSA said that the maximum waste volume at WIPP would have to be altered if downblended plutonium was sent there, but UCS said diluting the material in a matrix of concrete –rather than using a classified material known as “stardust”—should be reconsidered as an option. “DOE should consider a broader range of non-reactor alternatives, either singly or in combination, in order to establish which are compatible with the capabilities of the existing infrastructure,” the report said. “Combinations of options might work where there are commonalities in the processes needed to prepare plutonium for disposition.”
Safety, Security Concerns Raised About MOX
The UCS report is also critical of MOX due to security and safety concerns, as well as for its economic outlook. Lyman said immobilization and downblending would make the plutonium more difficult to access for potential terrorists looking to use the material to construct a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb. “Converting this plutonium to a form that is harder to steal or reuse in nuclear weapons is a critical long-term goal,” Lyman said. “But the MOX project actually increases near-term risks by making it easier for terrorists to steal plutonium during processing, transport or storage. And using plutonium-based fuel in nuclear reactors increases the risk of a serious accident.”
Lyman also noted that there are currently no buyers for the MOX fuel after Duke Energy pulled out of an agreement to buy the fuel in 2008. The Tennessee Valley Authority has also put plans to use MOX fuel on the backburner.
