Brian Bradley
NS&D Monitor
4/17/2015
A top Defense Department official told the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces this week that the U.S. is working with NATO’s conventional and nuclear planning groups on potential responses to Russia’s alleged violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. NATO is going to “look at this as a whole and understand that this is part of a broader aggressive posture from Russia,” said Robert Scher, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities.
Scher declined to comment any further, deferring the answer for closed session. “Because the Administration continues to formulate a comprehensive diplomatic, economic and military response to Russia’s violation I cannot be more specific regarding those military responses at this time,” Scher stated in written testimony to the hearing. “I can say, however, that our patience with Russian intransigence regarding its violation of the INF Treaty is not unlimited. As an Administration, we are committed to ensuring Russia does not achieve a significant military advantage from its violation. Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty does not compromise our capacity for strategic deterrence or extended deterrence, and it will not compromise our commitment to the security of our NATO Allies.”
‘Patience Is Not Limitless’
Released in July, the State Department’s 2014 Compliance Report accused Russia of violating the treaty, by developing a ground-launched cruise missile capable of hitting a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, the range prohibited by the treaty. The agreement bans development or deployment of conventional and nuclear systems in that range. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller told House lawmakers in December that Russian government officials have not acknowledged development of the missile.
Scher reiterated the U.S. is working to convince Russia to come back into compliance with the treaty. “The one breach that we have reported to you we have not been successful at getting them to understand that that is something that’s not in their interest to do, we believe,” Scher said at the hearing this week. “We will continue to work with them while looking at the military options, but our patience is not limitless on this.”
INF Treaty Called ‘Dead Letter’
Before this week’s hearing and testimony, a nuclear expert speaking during a Peter Huessy Breakfast Series event mentioned the alleged Russian INF violation as part of a series of recent contentious actions by Moscow, and recommended the U.S. invest more in its own strategic forces. On the other hand, arms control proponents are cautioning against an overreaction to the violation. “The INF Treaty is essentially a dead letter,” Dr. Mark Schneider, Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy, said during the breakfast event.
Defense Secretary Ash Carter earlier this year stated that the range of options the U.S. should consider to respond to Russia’s alleged violation include active defenses to counter Intermediate-Range Ground-launched cruise missiles, counter-force capabilities to prevent intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile attacks, and countervailing strike capabilities to enhance U.S. or allied forces. “I think the keyword here is ‘should,’ ” Schneider said about Carter’s statement. “I have very little confidence that the Obama Administration will do anything to respond to this with its remaining couple years in office.”
Really a Dead Letter?
Tom Collina, Director of Policy at the Ploughshares Fund, and Kingston Reif, Director of Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association, in separate interviews with NS&D Monitor countered the “dead letter” assertion. Both agreed that the treaty is still effective by preventing Russia from deploying the systems in Europe. “From that perspective, the worst thing the United States could do is withdraw from the treaty or do something that is a violation of the treaty in its own right, because that would give Russia the excuse to openly withdraw from the treaty and deploy these systems, which would be threatening to us,” Collina said. “Yes, they’re cheating on the treaty, and they should stop, but we shouldn’t overreact by throwing the treaty out.”
Collina backed the Obama Administration’s current approach toward Russia, while acknowledging that the U.S. is reasonable to keep its other stated possible actions on the table. “The question is, Do any of them make sense? And if so, at what point would they make sense?” he said. “I would caution not overreacting, but certainly, once or if Russia were to deploy a prohibited system, then I think the United States would need to take a clear action to show Russia that this is simply unacceptable.”
Reif said while Russia’s violation is a concern, Moscow has not deployed the missile yet, and added a U.S. diversion from its current course of action would harm national security. “Clearly, I think the treaty is under immense strain, given Russia’s violation, and that strain will get worse so long as Russia remains noncompliant, and especially if Russia starts deploying these non-compliant missiles, but it’s premature to say that the treaty is a dead letter.”
Reif said right now, the U.S. should continue calling out Russia for its violation, consider calling a meeting of the Special Verification Commission of technical experts established by the treaty, and explore bringing allies and, perhaps, China into discussions. “I think what will be most important for the United States will be to take steps to demonstrate our commitment to the defense of those allies that would be threatened by these new missiles, but I don’t think that we should be taking hasty actions that would threaten the treaty and lead to counterproductive escalatory cycles, such as developing new U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles for deployment in Europe. I don’t think that would be cost-effective or productive.”
