Brian Bradley
NS&D Monitor
5/8/2015
WARRENSBURG, Mo. — The top commander of the U.S. strategic forces pushed back this week against recent calls by a predecessor for the United States to reduce the high alert levels of its strategic deployed nuclear weapons. During the Strategic Deterrent Coalition’s symposium at the University of Central Missouri, held here, Adm. Cecil Haney, current commander of U.S. Strategic Command, questioned recent comments by former STRATCOM commander Gen. James Cartwright that the United States should consider taking its nuclear weapons off launch-ready alert. Haney said that he “was somewhat astonished to see his writings of recent associated with reducing the alert levels, and in fact, in one of the articles, it sort of implied that we should do so unilaterally, and perhaps that would generate the behaviors of others to join that bandwagon.”
Haney cautioned against de-alerting the weapons, urging remembrance of STRATCOM’s security measures to protect against spurious launches, and to ensure only the President can authorize launch. “I have a lot of respect for General [James] Cartwright,” Haney said. “This is an area that I fundamentally disagree with."
Is NC2 Vulnerable to Cyberattacks?
Cartwright, who served as STRATCOM commander from 2004 to 2007, led the Global Zero-sponsored report “De-Alerting and Stabilizing the World’s Nuclear Force Postures,” which was released last week and claimed that an outdated nuclear command and control network is vulnerable to cyberattacks, increasing the chances for a deliberate or accidental launch. “This concern is reason enough to remove nuclear missiles from launch-ready alert,” the report states. Cartwright also reportedly made similar remarks during a press conference last week. “These weapons that are on alert are particularly vulnerable to being hijacked or [the systems] indicate something that is not true in a situation where you only have a few minutes to make a decision,” POLITICO quoted Cartwright as saying. Haney defended STRATCOM’s cyber defense capabilities, though, saying the command “mind[s] the store very, very, very closely” on that matter.
De-Alert All ICBMs after Six Years?
The Global Zero report also says that the current high-alert status might make the decision-making spectrum for launching “far too short.” One way to dilute this risk, according to the report, is to de-alert the “hair-trigger” postures of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, persuading other countries to follow. Specifically, the report calls for the de-alerting of 800-900 high-alert weapons in both the United States and Russia, cutting high-alert forces by 20 percent within one year, 50 percent after three years, 80 percent after six years and 100 percent after 10 years if U.S.-Russian relations have returned to normal and security cooperation has deepened.
Other countries could be encouraged to take similar action with their nuclear weapons to follow the example set by the United States and Russia, the report says. “They would be expected to refrain from elevating alert status while entering into a process involving all nuclear weapons countries to achieve a comprehensive multilateral agreement that verifiably constrains the attack readiness of all their nuclear forces. In accepting such obligations, unilaterally or by formal agreement, they would ‘lock in’ the current low alert status of their nuclear forces and shelve any plans to raise it. This would arrest current trends toward rising alert levels in Asia and strengthen international security.”
Haney said verifiability of other states’ de-alerting would be key for any arms control measure, implying that unilateral reductions would be ineffective for U.S. stability. “We have to be further mindful of stepping away from that, and in terms of even coming up with a schema where more than one country would join that bandwagon, very similar to what the Four Horsemen said: ‘You have to be able to verify that piece,’ and if you can’t, it’s useless in my opinion,” he said. “It’s a piece that we cannot just wish away in order to be effective in this 21st century and going forward.”
‘Emotional Aspect’
Haney isn’t the only nuclear custodian who recently voiced opposition to sentiments backed by Global Zero. Maj. Gen. Garrett Harencak, Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, during an April 15 House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing said the description of nuclear weapons being on “hair-trigger alert”—commonly used by disarmament groups—is not accurate. “It’s an emotional aspect that people attached to this that is not fundamentally factual to what goes on in ICBM launch controlled facilities,” Harencak said. “They are very responsive, the most responsive aspect of our nuclear triad, but that characterization is inaccurate and unfair.”
