Todd Jacobson
NS&D Monitor
10/3/2014
The size of U.S. and Russian stockpiles of deployed nuclear weapons grew significantly over the last six months, according to the latest New START Treaty data released by the State Department this week. The Oct. 1 declaration reveals that the U.S. had 1,642 deployed warheads under the treaty’s counting rules as of Sept. 1, an increase of 57 warheads from its April 1 declaration. Russia’s deployed nuclear arsenal grew even more substantially, and with 1,643 warheads—a high since the treaty entered into force in 2011—Russia’s deployed stockpile was larger than the U.S. stockpile for the first time since the countries began declaring the size of their stockpiles under the New START Treaty in February of 2011. Russia’s deployed stockpile was 1,512 warheads six months ago, and hit a low of 1,400 accountable warheads a year ago. Both countries must be under the treaty’s 1,550-warhead cap by 2018. Officials did not provide any reasoning for the increases and decreases nor were details of the changes released.
The number of delivery vehicles (bombers, ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles) declared by each country also increased. The U.S. said it had 794 delivery vehicles, up 16 from six months ago, and Russia said 528 delivery vehicles were deployed, an increase of 30 from 498 a year ago. The U.S. said it had 912 deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles, while Russia said it had 911.
Expert: Increased Tensions Not to Blame For Increases
Despite increased tensions between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine and recent nuclear saber-rattling out of Moscow, nuclear weapons expert Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists said the Russian increases were largely the result of unrelated Russian efforts to stabilize the size of their nuclear forces and regular fluctuations of deployed weapons. “They’re trying to hold the line and not fall too low beyond the U.S. force structure,” Kristensen said. Kristensen noted that about 250 Russian sea-based and land-based missiles would be retired in the next decade, but the pace of the retirements had slowed while the introduction of new land-based missiles, including the RS-24, has accelerated. The introduction of Borei-class ballistic missile submarines also could be contributing to the Russian increases, Kristensen said. “These are big expensive programs” that have been planned for years, Kristensen said. “There’s a lot of people and money and what have you involved. This is part of their ongoing modernization. Even this picking up of the pace of the introduction of the RS24 I don’t think this has as much to do with the climate as it has to do more with the Russians are trying to prevent their overall force structure from sliding too far down as compared to the U.S.”
U.S. stockpile increases were largely the result of fluctuations involved in deployments, Kristensen said. Most notably, the return to service of the ballistic missile submarine USS West Virginia, which carries 24 missiles and approximately 100 warheads, is likely largely behind the spike in the size of the U.S. stockpile.
‘It Looks Really Bad’
Both the U.S. and Russia will likely have a difficult time explaining their relative lack of disarmament progress at next year’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference in New York, Kristensen said. Russia, in particular, will have a tough time explaining its increases. “It looks really bad that Russia now has more warheads deployed than when this treaty was signed,” he said. “It doesn’t mean they’re building up but it does mean they’re not heading in a consistent direction in terms of implementing it. Fluctuating down and up, that looks bad when you’re considering countries have to meet next year in New York at the NPT review conference. It will be harder for Russia to make its case that it’s doing what it needs to do because counties will look at that and say, ‘yes, but.’ It’s not smart on their part to do it.”
He said the U.S. also could get “beaten” up at the NPT review conference next year due to the slow pace of disarmament under the treaty, and suggested a worst case scenario would be if the frustrations prevent an agreement on a final document for the conference. “That would just leave a very gloomy atmosphere for the nonproliferation regime,” he said.
