The government of the United Kingdom this week largely kept mum regarding reports that it might directly take over decommissioning of its shuttered Magnox nuclear sites.
Industry sources told the Financial Times it appeared probable that the U.K. Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) would establish a subsidiary to manage cleanup of the 10 Magnox nuclear power plants and two research sites. Such a move would follow the planned 2019 termination of the existing contract, held by the Cavendish Fluor Partnership.
A spokesman on Monday said the NDA, a nondepartmental body that oversees remediation at all nuclear sites in the United Kingdom, could not speculate on any future decisions. The Department of Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy, which oversees the NDA, was said only to be considering options for the future of the Magnox facilities.
Industry sources contacted by RadWaste Monitor had also not shed light on the matter by deadline Friday.
Decommissioning of the U.K.’s nuclear facilities is managed by site license companies that are primarily managed by private companies. However, there would be precedent for bringing the Magnox work in-house: In 2016, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority made Sellafield Ltd., the cleanup contractor for the Sellafield nuclear site in Cumbria, a wholly owned subsidiary. Previously it had been operated by Nuclear Management Partners, a joint venture of URS, AREVA, and AMEC.
The first Magnox reactor power plant, Calder Hall, came online in 1956. The facilities operated for several decades, with the last shutdown, of the Wylfa 1 reactor, happening in December 2015.
The NDA in March announced that the £6.1 billion contract issued in 2014 to Cavendish Fluor’s Magnox Ltd. would expire on Aug. 31, 2019, nine years earlier than planned. The agency said at the time the understood scope of the Magnox decommissioning work had expanded significantly beyond what was covered in the contract. But the NDA has been hammered for its handling of the contract: The U.K. High Court said last year it botched the procurement process in a fashion that ensured Cavendish Fluor remained in consideration, which led to settlements of more than £97 million to nuclear services contractors EnergySolutions and Bechtel, which had teamed in an unsuccessful bid for the work.
The U.K. National Audit Office last week offered an unsparing review of the failings of the Magnox decommissioning contract process, citing a string of failures and a £122 million price tag for the nation’s taxpayers. It said the NDA’s “fundamental failures … raise serious questions about its understanding of procurement regulations; its ability to manage large, complex procurements.”
In March, as it set the termination date for the Magnox contract, the government also initiated an independent inquiry of the procurement. The inquiry issued its interim findings on Oct. 5. Its findings to date largely focused on problems with the system for scoring the four bids submitted for the Magnox contract, including its unnecessary complexity and an excessive number of pass/fail criteria, any one of which could push a bidder out of consideration.
Several boards within the NDA, and various other government agencies and auditors, all had some level of oversight and input into the contract process, the inquiry has found: “None of the multiple layers of governance, assurance and audit were successful in preventing the flaws in the Magnox Competition or intervened to stop the chain of events which gave rise to the Inquiry.”
The interim report provides several recommendations, including simplifying the scoring system and closely scrutinizing all pass/fail criteria, improving NDA governance of future contracts, and ensuring the agency has a “strong and well-resourced team” for procurements.
There was no immediate word this week on a schedule for completion of the inquiry, which continues to evaluate areas such as oversight and transparency in the Magnox procurement.
