Brian Bradley
NS&D Monitor
2/6/2015
Defense Secretary nominee Ashton Carter this week stated the Ohio-Class Replacement will “present unique constraints” on the Navy’s shipbuilding plan, especially if the Defense Department is required to be funded at Budget Control Act of 2011 levels. Should the funding caps return, Carter said he would meet with the Navy and Congress to manage the impact of Ohio-Class Replacement on the Navy’s shipbuilding (SCN) budget and ensure naval forces meet U.S. national defense needs, according to advanced policy questions before his Feb. 4 Senate Armed Services Committee confirmation hearing.
Responding to a question from Congress about Ohio-Class Replacement funding accounts—a Sea-Based Deterrence Fund has been set up for the program, though no money has been appropriated—Carter said he thought the program should be funded within the SCN budget, but stated that account associations was a secondary concern. “The Department needs adequate resources for modernization in order to ensure we can make the orderly transition to this new generation ballistic missile submarine,” Carter stated. “Which account it is funded in is of lesser importance. It makes the most sense to include the Ohio Replacement in the shipbuilding account, but this is a decision that can be made in the future.”
Carter served as Deputy Defense Secretary from 2011 to 2013, following a two-year stretch as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. He led the first Nuclear Posture Review in 1994 and served on the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. After hearing news of Carter’s presumptive nomination, nuclear weapon and nonproliferation experts alike expressed regard for his ability to bring a vast array of nuclear knowledge to his prospective post. “Carter, personally, clearly has an interest in this subject and would have a lead, potentially, over other candidates, with his knowledge of the area,” James Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told NS&D Monitor in early December. His initial SASC confirmation hearing was pushed back about a month as he recovered from back surgery. President Barack Obama tapped him as his Defense Secretary nominee in December, after current Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel stated plans to resign.
Carter Pledges Modernization/Nonproliferation Balance
During his confirmation hearing, Carter said he would support plans to ramp up efforts to secure fissile materials around the world while focusing on nuclear weapons modernization and the triad structure. “I think we need to do both and can do more in the way of securing fissile materials and the other wherewithal of nuclear weapons and also biological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction around the world,” Carter said. “And I also believe that the United States needs a safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent, because, as much as we would like to see nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction rid from the Earth, that doesn’t look like it’s something that’s going to happen soon. And it’s important that the American deterrent that we provide to our own country, but also to friends and allies who rely upon them, is safe, secure and reliable. So I think we need to do both and can do both.”
Responding to a question by Sen. Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.) about the three-headed nuclear triad and whether it meets U.S. deterrence requirements, Carter voiced support for the triad structure in lieu of a monad or dyad. “I think those deterrent requirements are going to be with us as far into the future as I can see,” he said. Carter is expected to be easily confirmed before the next recess, which is scheduled for the week of Feb. 16.
Carter: Budapest Memorandum Has Been ‘Violated’
Carter also said he was inclined to supply the Ukrainian military with lethal arms, after Russia “violated” the Budapest Memorandum by annexing Crimea. Under the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine abandoned its nuclear weapons capabilities in 1996 in exchange for the U.S., U.K. and Russia providing security assurances against the use of threats against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. “I think we need to support the Ukrainians in defending themselves,” Carter told the committee. “I can’t say right now, because I haven’t conferred with our military leaders or Ukrainian leaders. But I incline in the direction of providing them with arms, including … lethal arms.”
A Range of Options to Respond to Russian INF Violation
While Carter indicated that he would like to let U.S. diplomatic efforts to bring Russia back into compliance with the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty run their course, he said the U.S. should also consider a “comprehensive strategy” of economic and military responses in an effort to convince Russia to come back to compliance or ensure that U.S. security is maintained if Russia remains in noncompliance. “Such efforts [to bring Russia back into compliance] must be allowed to produce the desired effect,” Carter said. But “Russia’s continued disregard for its international obligations and lack of meaningful engagement on this particular issue require the United States to take actions to protect its interests and security as well as those of its allies and partners,” he added.
The State Department reported last summer that Russia violated the INF Treaty by developing a nuclear missile capable of hitting ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Testifying in December at a joint hearing of the House subcommittees on Strategic Forces and Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, Brian McKeon, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, told Congress members that the U.S. would seek to ensure Russia gained no significant military advantage if it did not return to INF compliance. Rose Gottemoeller, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, at the same hearing stated that Russia’s lack of acknowledgement in developing the missile constituted the treaty violation.
Carter: Russia Using Nukes to Offset U.S. and NATO Conventional Superiority
Carter said Russia’s violation is consistent with the country’s strategy of relying on nuclear weapons to offset U.S. and NATO “conventional military superiority,” and addressing a separate question, highlighted the allies’ reaffirmation of the effectiveness of the NATO nuclear deterrent at the NATO Wales Summit in September. “I support the conviction that NATO must maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to maintain Alliance security, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities,” Carter said.
If Russia remains in noncompliance with the treaty, Carter said in his answers to advance policy questions that DoD could look at “active defenses” to counter intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles, counterforce capabilities to prevent attacks by that type of missile, and “countervailing strike capabilities” to enhance U.S. or allied forces. “U.S. responses must make clear to Russia that if it does not return to compliance our responses will make them less secure than they are today,” he stated.
Nuclear Enterprise Reviews
During the hearing, Sen. Joe Donnelly (D-Ind.) asked Carter how he would address the findings of the recently released classified internal review of the nuclear enterprise, which the senator said contained “sobering” information. The review was conducted by Madelyn Creedon, Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, and Rear Adm. Pete Fanta, then-commander of Expeditionary Group Five. While Carter said he has not had access to the report, he said he understood that the reviews aimed to call attention to the need to prioritize the nuclear enterprise. Carter said nuclear weapons form the “bedrock” of U.S. nuclear security, and that he was committed to ensuring quality in nuclear weapons and command and control architectures.
