Todd Jacobson
NS&D Monitor
5/16/2014
With the Department of Energy looking at plutonium disposition alternatives to the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, the State Department’s top arms control official said late last week that she didn’t expect Russia to object to any changes to U.S. plans. Lawmakers that have opposed the Obama Administration’s decision to put the MOX facility in “cold standby” have also suggested that Russia might oppose changes to the 2011 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement. “The plutonium disposition agreement per se does not require a particular disposition mechanism,” Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller said at a Defense Writers Group breakfast May 9. “Clearly we’ll have to be completely transparent with the Russians and talk to them about the methods we are going to pursue but I don’t see it necessarily as being a major issue.”
The MOX facility is currently the United States’ designated pathway to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons grade plutonium in the agreement with Russia. But citing major cost increases and tight budgets, the National Nuclear Security Administration announced in March that it would immediately suspend work on the facility, and later postponed the suspension until the start of FY 2015 in the face of a lawsuit from South Carolina, where the facility is being constructed.
U.S. to Keep Russia Informed of Plans
A report detailing the NNSA’s analysis of five plutonium disposition options—including MOX—was released earlier this month and identified downblending surplus plutonium and disposing of it at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant as the least expensive option by billions of dollars. The WIPP option would cost about $8.8 billion and be completed in 2046 with less risk and uncertainty than MOX, according to the report. That is $16.3 billion less than the “to go” costs for MOX, which the report estimates at $25.1 billion with a completion date of 2043 with “significant risks.” Those figures include construction and lifecycle costs for the facility. Other options considered were deep borehole disposal, immobilization of the material, and irradiating the plutonium in fast reactors.
There is precedent for a change in the agreement. Russia changed its mind on its disposition path, choosing to burn its MOX fuel in fast reactors, and NNSA nonproliferation chief Anne Harrington told Congress in early April that Russia had been “unexpectedly sympathetic” about the situation facing the U.S. In her recent comments, Gottemoeller emphasized that Russia would be kept informed of the U.S. plans. “Clearly we understand that we’ll have to talk in depth with Russia. … The point of the agreement is to dispose of the plutonium so that it cannot be reused in the future in weapons so they’ll have to be satisfied on that but it’s early days to approach them with any particular option. We’re still looking at it.”
Walking and Chewing Gum
Gottemoeller also said nuclear security work in Russia was continuing despite tensions between Russia and the U.S. over Ukraine, and she emphasized it should continue despite suggestions by some Republicans that such cooperation should stop. “We shouldn’t shoot ourselves in the foot in terms of stopping or halting important national security work that prevents nuclear bombs from getting into the hands of terrorists because we have other grave concerns,” Gottemoeller said. “We can walk and chew gum at the same time. We must continue to address our core national security concerns while we address these grave concerns about the crisis in Ukraine.”
She added: “It is manifestly in the national security interest of the United States to continue to wrestle with minimizing the danger that fissile materials will fall into the hands of terrorists, minimize the opportunities for nuclear weapons to fall into the hands of terrorists. That is at the heart of our rationale for continuing this work.”
Defending Disarmament
Gottemoeller also defended the pace of U.S. efforts to reduce the size of its nuclear stockpile in seeming reaction to criticism from countries that argued at the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee meeting earlier this month that nuclear weapons states weren’t cutting their stockpiles quickly enough. The U.S. said earlier this month that it had reduced the size of its active stockpile to 4,804 warheads, 85 percent less than its peak of 31,255 in 1967. “There’s a lot of arm waving that goes on often … among certain parts of the community saying, ‘Oh, nothing’s been done, nothing’s been accomplished,’” Gottemoeller said. “Is it enough? No, and the president said we want to get to zero. It’s going to take time. It’s going to take hard work.”
