The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) finalized its first safety recommendation to the Donald Trump administration’s Department of Energy, urging the agency to improve the safety of nuclear explosives handling at the Pantex weapons assembly plant in Amarillo, Texas, documents published Tuesday show.
In the recommendation, the independent federal board zeroed in on equipment and processes at Pantex crucial to weapons life-extension programs past, present, and future: the B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb, the first of which DOE plans to produce by Sept. 30, 2020; the W78 and W87 intercontinental ballistic missile warheads; and the the W76 submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead, a small number of which DOE is now modifying for low yield after refurbishing an estimated 1,500 of the weapons for another 30 years of service.
Safety recommendations from the DNFSB are not binding on DOE, but the agency is legally required to agree or disagree publicly with them. The department’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) replied to a draft copy of the recommendation on Jan. 28, but that response had not been made public at deadline Friday for Nuclear Security & Deterrence Monitor.
Some of the identified deficiencies at Pantex, the DNFSB stated, could result in “high explosive violent reaction and/or inadvertent nuclear detonation consequences” that could give members of the public outside Pantex’s gates a radiation dose “significantly” higher than 25 rem — around 5.5 percent of what the Nuclear Regulatory Commission considers a lethal dose, and the maximum dose DOE plans against when assessing the risks of nuclear-weapon servicing.
Among the hazards identified by the DNFSB: cracks in a tool used to lift high explosives out of W76 warheads; procedures that may expose the W87’s arming system to jostling during disassembly; the potential for a worker to crush parts of the B61 by tripping and falling on a certain piece of equipment; and even the potential that a W78 warhead could be struck by lightning while moving from one location to another within Pantex.
The DNFSB said it issued its recommendation after “multiple interactions between November 2017 and March 2018” with the NNSA and Pantex managenent contractor Consolidated Nuclear Security (CNS): a Bechtel National-led team with Leidos, Northrop Grumman, SOC, and subcontractor Booz Allen Hamilton that took over the site in 2014.
Some of the board’s concerns with Pantex date back as far as 2010, when Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Pantex ran the plant, according to the recommendation.
“CNS continues to implement improvements in the content, configuration management, and implementation of the safety basis for nuclear explosive operations at the Pantex Plant,” a CNS spokesperson said by email Thursday morning. “This ongoing work will also address the recent Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board recommendation. We have made significant progress in recent years to address challenges with legacy Pantex safety basis submittals, compliance, and controls, and we will continue to work with NNSA and the Board to make additional improvements that further strengthen the program.”
In defense of DOE and CNS, the defense board said it found “adequate controls for the vast majority of credible hazard scenarios” associated with nuclear-explosives handling at Pantex.
