Paul Donahue
CEO, G4S Government Solutions
Since taking over as CEO of WSI (G4S Government Solutions, Inc.) months before the Y-12 intrusion in July of 2012, it’s no surprise I’ve found it necessary to revisit, refocus and refine core security and oversight practices that did not adequately facilitate at Y-12 independence of thought and effective escalation of ground conditions. We were unaggressive in ensuring appropriate independent oversight—“after-sight” is not oversight. We were tolerant in not pressure-checking seams and escalating issues outside the chain of command. And, we were conditioned in underestimating what can be simple by overly focusing on the complex. The greatest threat to the most experienced sniper isn’t 1,000 yards from the end of his scope, it’s 10 yards away on the periphery of his view. With five decades of experience, we earned our reputation by adjusting our practices as our environment around us required—and by taking ownership of not just the good that occurs. Those who volunteer to protect those around them deserve our best attention. This is what we do, and because of our people, we are the best at it.
In January 1965, WSI was awarded the prestigious Nevada Test Site contract under the then-Atomic Energy Commission, led by Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg. It was a contract previously operated by an affiliate of Burn’s, called Federal Services, Incorporated. Thanks to the Anti-Pinkerton Act of 1893, and still on the books today, detective agencies were disallowed from bidding contracts and this caused grief to the Commission. Separation from our Wackenhut commercial parent allowed WSI to offer new paramilitary services and provide an alternate option to the Commission. Over these 50 years, I’d like to state there were no strikes, and no operational disruptions; but that is simply untrue. No agency or support company can work five decades flawlessly. We survived and thrived by anticipating and learning from mistakes, not repeating them, and by sharing best practices openly with all stakeholders.
Similarly, in June 1950, the Atomic Energy Commission asked E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company to undertake what would become the Savannah River Site. Du Pont had design, construction and full operational duties to include security. After multiple security assessment failures in the 1980s, and with help from Rep. John Dingell (D-Mich.), Congress, the White House and the Secretary of Energy, it was determined that a separate security services contract to a professional security organization be solicited. WSI won the contract in August 1983 playing a groundbreaking role in reshaping and refocusing the security mission so that it would maintain the ideals of safety and security, consolidated with unity of command, in a dedicated security company. Not unlike today, we aim to ensure the right checks and balances of performance and oversight exist to ensure we prevent mistakes where possible, admit to them when made, and not repeat them.
Lastly as yet another example, after Rockwell International sole-sourced plant operations to EG&G at Rocky Flats, the FBI conducted a night raid on the EG&G security team, and that resulted in a call to WSI in July 1990. The EG&G force was short 63 persons and the focus was primarily on day-to-day operations and not integrated security. The supervisory ratios as another example were greater than twenty-to-one and there were too many other issues to mention here for reasons bearing on sensitive procedures. With proven experience now in Nevada, Savannah and the then Central Training Academy in New Mexico, WSI was selected to be the dedicated security force where we remained until its closure over a decade later. That 12 or so years of service required employees and managers to deal with the inherent adversity of continual change. A plant on closure with an actual target date creates all kinds of unique labor issues unknown to going concern contracts.
As we did then, we aim to maintain values, professionalism and integrity consistent with the agency we support. We have several similar historical scenarios to the above within NASA and DHS that mirror these within DOE. In my 20 years in service to the government and specifically DOE/NNSA, change is as rampant now as ever and this is the wheel of progress. We serve three dozen federal agencies and none have the unique mission requirements that any of the one-of-a-kind DOE sites have. None have the security order complexity, field strength or HQ oversight that DOE requires. As a matter of fact, as we look for new minority/majority investors and potential owners in our company, most companies initially interested were intimidated by the inherent risk associated with what we consider a normal mission. As a result, we’re a year into the process and have yet to find the right partner willing and able to balance risk and reward within this complex environment.
Today, in our relative spoke in this wheel of progress, and with some guidance from our previous DOE secretary, Dr. Steven Chu, we’ve implemented new independent Corporate Assurance Visits across all DOE sites utilizing internal and external past and present luminary security experts to ensure we are meeting our mission. We’ve implemented new field-to-HQ open lines, through my office, to ensure communication is never inhibited and ambiguities are clear before actions are taken. We’ve worked diligently on ensuring any “too good to fail” culture that was built upon earlier successes changed post by post and shift by shift. We maintain our reputation with each shift, and after nearly two years of independent testing and retesting, I have terrific confidence in those standing each shift. We’ve implemented new customer reports that allow and encourage escalation of concerns to federal site managers and headquarters without retribution. This has been well received by everyone throughout the affected chain. We are working, auditing, testing and collaborating closer than ever with each federal partner (or commercial partner) to ensure we are all successful as teammates in difficult, important missions. We’ve also enhanced all oversight by increasing three-fold the number of reach-back, support and corporate HQ oversight visits. These already implemented changes, along with a complete security organizational revamp, are just a few of the many already in place required in today’s increasingly complex environment. This is what we do, and because of our people, we are the best at it.
