The Nuclear Regulatory Commission needs to establish clear and consistent expectations for staff when completing its significance determination process (SDP) for nuclear reactors, the agency’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) recommended in a report released Monday.
The NRC uses SDP in determining the significance of safety or security concerns identified during inspections at nuclear power plants. The agency uses color-coded designations for the findings, ascending in order from green (very low risk significance) to white, yellow, and red.
“NRC does not know the amount of resources used by staff and managers to complete various steps in the SDP,” the report states. “Additionally, unclear questions used to screen issues identified during inspections have made it difficult for inspectors to determine whether issues should be categorized as either minor or more-than-minor.”
The OIG noted that NRC has been unable to produce documentation of independent audits for greater-than-green inspection findings, “despite recently reporting that these inspection findings were assessed by an independent auditor.”
The OIG recommended that NRC clarify screening questions for findings that are “more than minor,” and implement controls ensuring that independent audits of findings above the green classification are performed and documented.
The NRC, in Sept. 7 comments on the report, concurred with the OIG recommendation to establish clear and consistent expectations for SDP staff and management. However, staff said the amount of time and resources expended for each step identified in the recommendation needs to be assessed.
“The staff plans to evaluate the SDP workflow effectiveness, but not assess the time and resources needed to implement each step of the process,” NRC staff wrote.
Because the NRC does not have controls in place to ensure these independent audits are performed and documented, OIG said the regulator risks inaccurately portraying agency activities, and might miss opportunities to implement needed changes identified in audits.
According to the report, NRC staff and managers leading the SDP were unfamiliar with the “predictability and repeatability metric or its requirement that an independent audit be performed.”
“Some of those who were aware of the metric and independent audit requirement were unable to specify who had been responsible for conducting the audits in the past or verify whether these audits had been performed at all,” the report states. “Neither staff nor management could specify where documentation of independent audits could be found.”
The NRC disputed the assertion that it is unable to verify independent audits.
“The staff has historically and successfully performed the required audits, consistent with IMC 307, ‘Reactor Oversight Process Self-Assessment Metrics,’ Appendix A and documented in the required by the annual Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) self-assessment and documented in the associated Commission paper,” NRC commented. “The staff does agree that more comprehensive documentation of the conduct of these audits is appropriate.”
