Alissa Tabirian
NS&D Monitor
7/24/2015
The use of weapon-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) for civilian applications worldwide is becoming a thing of the past despite political obstacles, according to Andrew Bieniawski, vice president of material security and minimization at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and a former National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) official. Bieniawski late last month presented the findings and policy recommendations of the nongovernmental Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) ahead of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. A primary area of focus in the report is the conversion of “all remaining civil HEU fuel reactors to LEU by 2035.”
In an interview with NS&D Monitor, Bieniawski said HEU was once necessary for the operation of research reactors, but technological advancements over the years have offered a new solution: “high-density, low-enriched uranium” that “provides an equal flux” as the HEU used in research. However, “one of the biggest obstacles [to HEU elimination] is political,” Bieniawski said, because “some of the countries see the HEU as providing some prestige.” He said that despite this obstacle, HEU elimination is on its way to becoming an international norm. “The movement is clearly towards HEU minimization and elimination,” Bieniawski said.
Progress has been driven by collaborative initiatives such as HEU-Free Zones – as is the case with Latin America – U.S.-Russian fuel removals and repatriation from partner nations, and research reactor conversions. One of the programs highlighted in Bieniawski’s published work is the NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which has led to the conversion or closure of 92 HEU research reactors around the world since 2004. In the interview, Bieniawski stressed that progress in global HEU minimization is driven by voluntary commitments and said the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should remain a significant partner in these activities in the future.
An IAEA representative told NS&D Monitor by email that the U.N. nuclear watchdog “will continue to support Member States upon request” in initiatives involving HEU conversion. The IAEA agreed that most research reactors could operate with LEU fuel, but that “there are some high performance/high power research reactors which would require high-density LEU fuel in order to keep their capabilities.” The high-density LEU that would be required to operate these reactors “is still not available on the market,” although “there are some new high-density LEU fuel types . . . under development and qualification,” the IAEA said. In agreement with Bieniawski, the agency also said, “we have seen significant movement forward on [HEU elimination] over the years,” as “countries are generally committed to the use of LEU.”
Outlook on Russia
Bieniawski and Miles Pomper, senior research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, authored a paper in May that outlined a five-pathway road map for HEU minimization and elimination. The pathways cited are the conversion of civilian HEU reactors, HEU fuel repatriation and the development of international HEU-free zones, conversion to LEU of medical isotope production facilities, research for LEU fuel use in naval reactors, and downblending of excess HEU stocks.
The paper notes that “there are still approximately 108 civilian facilities” globally using HEU, mostly in Russia. Although U.S. engagement with Russia “has been hampered by political constraints” and the country is “unlikely” to convert its HEU reactors by 2035, the report recommends bilateral U.S.-Russian partnerships on spent fuel removal programs and technical research. Bieniawski told NS&D Monitor that the geopolitical freeze between Washington and Moscow has not ended all cooperation, and that Russian officials should develop their own national plan for research reactor conversion. He said “the burden now is on Russia to really sustain those [previous] efforts” for civilian reactor conversion, adding that many of Russia’s research reactors and facilities “are underutilized” and could be shut down or used for shared research. “It’s in their national interest to make sure that their facilities are secure, that research reactors are converted,” he said.
Despite Russia’s withdrawal from the next Nuclear Security Summit, the FMWG report says “the United States and Russia should restart as soon as possible a high-level dialogue on reactor conversion, either bilaterally or multilaterally.” The details of such a dialogue remain unclear, but the IAEA noted that Russia “has so far continued to support HEU minimization activities to secure storage of Russian-origin HEU” under the 2002 Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program, through a partnership between the U.S., Russia, and IAEA.
R&D for Naval Reactors
The FMWG’s HEU elimination recommendations include “additional research and development funds” from the NNSA to identify opportunities for converting U.S. HEU-powered naval reactors to use LEU. This should be done in conjunction with research already conducted by several national laboratories, including Argonne and Idaho, Bieniawski said. He noted that “you can have a modern, effective fleet” without using HEU, calling attention to the French navy, which only uses LEU.
To implement this conversion in the United States, Bieniawski recommended a focus on R&D and information sharing among countries seeking to do the same. The U.S. Navy, seemingly hesitant to consider low-enriched uranium for naval propulsion, previously reported to Congress that LEU use would require frequent refueling and increased maintenance costs. However, asked about the effects of LEU use on naval reactors, Bieniawski said more research is necessary to identify potential operational impacts. The results of this research, he said, could then be part of the decision-making process. In response to a similar question, the IAEA said, “These are matters of research and development and we would avoid prejudging results.”
