Some parallel efforts by the National Nuclear Security Administration and Defense Department to secure nuclear materials around the globe may be redundant if their individual mission goals are not more clearly defined, the Government Accountability Office found in a new report.
The GAO looked into 23 separate NNSA and DoD programs and found that “some conduct similar work in the same countries” and though some of those efforts overlap, they” generally coordinate with one another,” the report, published March 30, said.
Both NNSA and DoD continually work with other countries to help secure weapons usable nuclear material and nuclear facilities and counter nuclear materials smuggling. Other U.S. federal agencies perform similar work, leading to potentially duplicative efforts to achieve the same goal.
Federal officials and nuclear security experts regularly identify and monitor risks to the security of nuclear materials worldwide, such as inadequate physical security where the materials are stored. NNSA, DoD and other agencies work with other countries to beef up security for weapons usable nuclear material, but challenges remain, GAO found.
For countries with security risks, the state of bilateral relations limits U.S. efforts to secure international nuclear materials, the report said.
“A few of the overlapping programs did not clearly document their roles and responsibilities, as called for in leading practices for collaboration,” GAO found. “For example, a DOD program has plans to undertake nuclear security capacity-building efforts in two countries where NNSA programs are undertaking similar efforts.”
