Todd Jacobson
NS&D Monitor
1/16/2015
James Doyle, the Los Alamos National Laboratory nonproliferation analyst who claimed he was let go by the lab after writing a paper advocating for the abolition of nuclear weapons, has had his second whistleblower claim accepted by the National Nuclear Security Administration and began mediation with the lab this week. Doyle’s initial whistleblower complaint was based on his allegation that he was retaliated against after a journal article he wrote was classified after it was initially approved for release, and that complaint was rejected. But he filed a second complaint based on the fact that he was let go by the lab in July before his first whistleblower complaint was resolved. That complaint was accepted Nov. 5, and mediation with the lab began Jan. 14 at DOE’s Forrestal Building in Washington.
While the acceptance of the claim does not mean that Doyle’s whistleblower claim will be upheld, it’s a step further than his initial complaint proceeded. If the mediation is not successful, the complaint can be referred to DOE’s Office of Hearings and Appeals for an investigation and a hearing. After the meeting, Doyle said no agreement had been reached but both sides were considering options. The lab declined to comment, citing the confidentiality of the mediation process. “We wouldn’t have anything to say beyond what we’ve already said because this mediation is considered confidential,” Los Alamos spokesman Kevin Roark said.
Doyle Not Expecting Job Back
Doyle told NS&D Monitor before the mediation with the lab began that he is not expecting to get his old job back, but would like a more substantial severance package than the three-and-a-half months he was offered when he was let go by the lab. He also said he’d like additional benefits, including health insurance, retirement and University of California in-state tuition for his children, which is a benefit provided to lab employees. “There’s a possibility” of returning to the lab, “but at this point I don’t want my job back,” he said. “The atmosphere is still toxic. The manager that made these decisions, several of them are still there. I guess there is a possibility they could put together a proposal to me for a multi-year contract but it’s kind of ridiculous because they claimed they laid me off because they didn’t have any work for me … so what am I going to work on?”
Doyle said he was employed at the lab for 16-and-a-half years, and that he is looking for a severance payment in the range of 18-to-24 months. “Letting someone my age go and in a location where they’re the only employer in an equivalent career path, that’s unacceptable to me,” he said.
While the lab has said Doyle’s dismissal was related to a series of layoffs, he has argued that it was linked to an article that was published in the international journal Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. The article was published in early 2013, but after being initially cleared by the lab for publication, he was told the article contained classified information. Doyle was placed on investigatory leave for a day without pay, his top-secret clearance was suspended for 30 days, and he was stripped of his access to classified information about the nuclear arsenals of other countries. The report argued for the elimination of nuclear weapons, which echoed President Obama’s nuclear platform.
Doyle Releases Report Calling for More Funding for Nonprolif., Verification Technologies
Since his dismissal, Doyle has worked with several organizations, including Nuclear Watch New Mexico, Harvard University’s Belfer Center, the Stimson Center, and the Fissile Materials Working Group. This week, he authored a report published by Nuclear Watch New Mexico that suggests the United States should devote significantly more resources to developing nonproliferation and verification technologies.
The report, “Essential Capabilities Needed for Nuclear Security: A National Program for Nonproliferation and Verification Technology Development,” argues that developing nonproliferation and verification technologies are being neglected in favor of nuclear weapons spending with “perilous consequences.” Doyle proposes $125-$150 million in annual funding to develop new verification technologies. He also suggests that the issue be undertaken by an integrated multiagency program involving the Department of Energy, Pentagon and State Department. “Such a program is affordable at a fraction of the cost of other nuclear infrastructure modernization tasks, and is needed to maintain nuclear security in an evolving security environment,” Doyle said.
He said such technologies will become even more needed if nuclear stockpiles around the world are to continue to shrink. “Nonproliferation and arms verification have for too long been considered ‘soft power’ tools of the diplomatic and arms control communities,” he said. “Real nuclear security requires that we now consider these capabilities as vital elements of our national security infrastructure.”
This story was updated Jan. 22, 2015 to clarify the timing of comments made by Doyle to NS&D Monitor.
