Consolidated Nuclear Security set up a reliable fire suppression system and procedures at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tenn., according to a recent assessment by the Department of Energy’s Office of Enterprise Assessments.
The Bechtel National-led site prime contractor “has established a comprehensive sitewide [fire protection program] and policy to ensure the effective implementation of Y-12 fire protection requirements,” the Office of Enterprise Assessments (EA) said in a report published Tuesday.
The assessment evaluated the effectiveness of Consolidated Nuclear Security’s (CNS) fire suppression systems specifically for buildings 9204-2E and 9215 and the company’s management of open issues related to fire protection safety systems.
Building 9204-2E is used for disassembly and assembly of nuclear stockpile components, dismantling of unneeded components and stockpile quality evaluations and maintenance. 9215 is a uranium machining and finishing facility.
EA identified several particular strengths – and a few weaknesses – within the site’s fire suppression program.
Topping the list of kudos was effective quarterly self-assessments by CNS of open fire protection impairments “that formally verify the status of corrective actions, monitor the sustained implementation of assigned compensatory actions, and reinforce the priority of completing corrective actions,” EA said in its report.
The inspection also found that the CNS Y-12 Fire Department training program effectively prepares personnel to perform technical safety requirement surveillance and inspection, testing, and maintenance in accordance with site fire suppression requirements.
The site’s fire department also has developed and implemented a thorough pre-incident planning program that enhances the effectiveness and safety of emergency response activities, the report says.
NNSA’s Production Office “has performed effective oversight of CNS’s response to recent “high priority fire protection issues” and routinely engages with CNS to monitor trends,” the report says.
However, CNS has not fully integrated glove box fire hazard evaluation information for building 9204-2E into the facility’s fire hazards analysis, EA found. The design description for a wet pipe sprinkler system in building 9204-2E has not been updated and is not consistent with the facility’s safety analysis report, EA found.
Finally, CNS has not specified an acceptance criterion of 60 seconds maximum, as specified by National Fire Protection Association design requirements, for the water delivery time to the inspector’s test connection for a dry-pipe valve full-flow trip test, the EA report says.
“In summary, CNS has effectively established and implemented a FPP, controls, and operating practices for buildings 9204-2E and 9215,” the report says. “Resolution of the weaknesses identified in this report will serve to enhance the management and overall effectiveness of the CNS [fire protection program], controls, and operating practices.”
