Nuclear Security & Deterrence Monitor Vol. 20 No. 12
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Nuclear Security & Deterrence Monitor
Article 9 of 10
March 18, 2016

Group of Fissile Material Experts Encourages Ban on All HEU Production

By Alissa Tabirian

It would only take a few decades to phase out all non-weapon use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) worldwide, making a ban on the production of HEU for any purpose a feasible policy goal, according to a new report from the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), a group of nonproliferation experts from 18 countries.

The report, authored by physicist Frank von Hippel, a professor of public and international affairs at Princeton University, said approximately 7 tons of weapon-grade HEU – enough for 100 first-generation gun-type nuclear weapons – are currently in use globally for non-weapon purposes: fuel for naval and icebreaker propulsion reactors, tritium-production and breeder reactors, and research reactors; and for medical radioisotope production. It would take “at most a few decades” to transition these non-weapon uses of HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) “or non-fission alternatives that would pose a much reduced risk of fueling nuclear proliferation or of nuclear terrorism,” the report said. In the meantime, according to von Hippel, Russian and U.S. stockpiles of excess HEU could meet worldwide requirements for non-weapon purposes.

The report noted that naval reactor conversions from HEU to LEU fuel would take the greatest amount of time, as there are currently over 150 nuclear-powered submarines and ships worldwide that use HEU fuel. The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Naval Reactors in a 2014 report to Congress asserted that “the potential exists” to effectively use LEU fuel in naval reactors, but Congress has remained largely unconvinced of the merits of such a transition. The report also said about half of the 100 HEU-fueled research reactors now in operation are in Russia. “Worldwide, about 60 of these 100 reactors are critical assemblies or pulsed reactors, all but a few of which could be retired with the rest consolidated into one or two high-security sites per country,” it said. Von Hippel added that the medical radioisotope production industry’s transition to LEU use “could be virtually complete within the next few years.”

However, this process is not without obstacles, said IPFM member Pavel Podvig, a researcher at the Program on Science and Global Security and WMD program lead at the U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research. Speaking Tuesday at the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Podvig said the prospects for HEU minimization in Russia “are uncertain at best.”

“The key problem is that there is no institutional support for minimization,” he said, adding that there is “no one in Russia who would kind of push this agenda forward.” Podvig said U.S.-Russian cooperation once “moved the process,” but not since many of their shared threat reduction programs have been phased out. He also said the “fairly weak” regulatory structure in Russia and the lack of incentives for facility operators present obstacles to HEU elimination. Additionally, “today there is no internal support in Rosatom,” the state nuclear energy corporation that “has a monopoly on dealing with these issues,” he said.

Podvig said a long-term effort to address these problems would require Rosatom’s support. “To do that there needs to be a stronger case for minimization,” he said. As long as HEU is still used in U.S. and U.K. naval reactors, the policy on HEU minimization remains inconsistent, he said. “Russia would ask . . . why our HEU reactors are different from those reactors in France or the United States that are scheduled to operate for 20 more years.”

A recent study from a National Academy of Sciences committee said global elimination of HEU use in civilian reactors is expected to take longer than previously estimated due to political and technical challenges. While the NNSA’s fiscal 2009 budget request forecast a 2018 completion date, the latest projections push that back to 2035. The study recommended the continued development of high-density LEU fuel, pursuit of an interim solution to reduce civilian weapon-grade material use, and U.S.-Russian science engagement on collaborative HEU minimization opportunities.

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NEW: Via public records request, I’ve been able to confirm reporting today that a warrant has been issued for DOE deputy asst. secretary of spent fuel and waste disposition Sam Brinton for another luggage theft, this time at Las Vegas’s Harry Reid airport. (cc: @EMPublications)

DOE spent fuel lead Brinton accused of second luggage theft.



by @BenjaminSWeiss, confirming today's reports with warrant from Las Vegas Metro PD.

Waste has been Emplaced! 🚮

We have finally begun emplacing defense-related transuranic (TRU) waste in Panel 8 of #WIPP.

Read more about the waste emplacement here: https://wipp.energy.gov/wipp_news_20221123-2.asp

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