Alissa Tabirian
NS&D Monitor
9/25/2015
The Department of Energy (DOE) and other agencies tasked with conducting global nonproliferation operations have not conducted physical security visits to 11 foreign nuclear sites containing over 3,500 kilograms of U.S.-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) in more than 20 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) said in a report released this week.
The DOE cited “political challenges, including access to key sites, and technical concerns” as factors stalling the progress of nonproliferation activities, according to the report. The GAO also said interagency teams failed to conduct site visits at least every five years to facilities that contain “Category I quantities of U.S.-origin nuclear material” and therefore require “the most stringent set of recommended physical protection measures.” Category I material is defined as at least 2 kilograms of unirradiated plutonium or 5 kilograms of uranium-235 in unirradiated HEU, the report says.
Moreover, the GAO’s review of physical protection visit records revealed that U.S. interagency teams had not visited four Category I and seven Category II sites that “hold 2,261 kilograms unirradiated U.S.-origin HEU and 1,327 kilograms of irradiated U.S.-origin HEU” in at least two decades. The report says DOE “has not yet provided GAO with a time frame for prioritizing and conducting such visits” to verify that the nuclear material is safely and securely stored under international physical security guidelines.
The report notes that as part of President Barack Obama’s 2009 interagency initiative to secure the world’s nuclear materials within four years, for which DOE plays the largest role, the department from April 2009 to December 2013 removed 1,581 kilograms of HEU and plutonium and downblended 4,900 kilograms of HEU to LEU, exceeding its first goal by 400 kilograms and the second by 2,200 kilograms. However, DOE failed to meet its target in two other activities outlined in the initiative that cost over $50 million: it made physical protection upgrades for 32 buildings at three sites in Russia, falling short by 11 buildings, and converted 23 foreign reactors from HEU to LEU, falling short by 11 reactors.
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) spokeswoman Shelley Laver confirmed that all HEU has now been removed from a total of 28 countries plus Taiwan. The GAO cites a 2013 report that found “more than 13,000 kilograms of U.S.-origin HEU” and around 780,000 kilograms total of HEU remain worldwide. The DOE has made new plans to remove 1,029 kilograms of HEU and plutonium and convert 27 foreign research reactors between 2014 and fiscal 2019 at a planned cost of $639 million, the latest report notes.
The GAO identified other challenges in future progress in this nonproliferation effort: DOE does not have a global inventory of U.S.-origin plutonium to identify the location of “vulnerable weapons-usable materials” and has not established “a prioritization of nuclear materials” that would “identify the most vulnerable material stocks to focus efforts on” worldwide. The GAO recommended DOE create a list prioritizing the removal or disposition of foreign nuclear inventories and plan site visits in countries that host U.S.-origin material, “particularly those that have not been visited in 20 or more years.” The DOE said it would complete the prioritization list by the end of this month but said it considers the second recommendation closed. The NNSA did not respond to requests for comment by press time.
