Brian Bradley
NS&D Monitor
12/4/2015
A Mission Impossible-like, self-destructing file is one of several potential options for safe 3-D printing of nuclear weapons while limiting the spread of additive-manufactured bomb components abroad, experts said Tuesday as policymakers and nuclear experts wrestle with an ever-evolving array of global risk scenarios surrounding the technology.
Matthew Kroenig, a national security expert at Georgetown University,? during a panel discussion at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, explained that it will be critical to protect digital build files, which are the data and processes that tell printers how to construct objects, to ensure the safety of 3-D printing nukes. All instructions and prompts needed for 3-D printing an object are contained in these build files.
Kroenig was joined on the panel by Tristan Volpe, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow and associate at the Carnegie Endowment, and Bruce Goodwin, associate director-at-large for national security policy and research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. All three tried to present and tackle some 3-D printing-related proliferation concerns spurred by the recent surge in additive manufacturing. The panelists said given the rise of 3-D printing in the U.S. and other industrialized and P5 nations, countries will inevitably pursue additive manufacturing nuclear weapons in the future.
Both Kroenig and Volpe seemed to agree that the cybersecurity and export control sectors will likely be required to directly grapple with important nuclear security-related questions as 3-D printing is used to build an increasing number of goods.
The latest 3-D printers capable of producing metallic objects are available on the unrestrained commercial market; they do not trigger export controls, have a very small detection footprint—being about the size of a commercial refrigerator—and produce very little waste. “The digital nature of production really lowers the tacit knowledge threshold for 3-D components, whereas before it took a lot of expertise and skill to set up a machine shop,” Volpe said during the discussion. “Really, the digital nature of production also provides a way for countries to get around the transportation nodes and global hubs that authorities have traditionally monitored to regulate the shipment of components around the world, and at times, to interdict very suspicious shipments from Europe to a suspect and user, let’s say, in the Middle East.”
It is yet impossible to 3-D print plutonium or highly enriched uranium, and the process won’t change nuclear fuel cycle principles, but the technology will likely ease and expedite manufacturing the smaller, constituent parts of nuclear weapons that usually take countries several years to produce, Volpe said.
“There are no easy solutions here,” Kroenig said, recommending the U.S. follow the footsteps of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who in 1975 convened an international meeting on nuclear weapons production. Kroenig said such a meeting between international leaders whose countries possess 3-D printing capabilities, perhaps during next year’s Nuclear Security Summit, could address the printing issue. Fortunately for the U.S., he said, is most countries with those capabilities are allies, with China, a major 3-D printing manufacturer, as an exception.
Securing digital build files—the data and processes that tell printers how to construct objects—will be paramount to ensure the safety of 3-D printing nukes. All instructions and prompts needed for 3-D printing an object are contained in these build files. The “Mission Impossible” build file analogy was one of a couple file safeguard options referenced by Kroenig, who also proposed dispersing sensitive digital build products on separate parts in separate databases. “That way, if you have a cyber hacker who comes in and gets access to part of the file, he doesn’t have the complete picture,” he said. “More broadly, I think the point here is we really need some hard thinking and collaboration between cybersecurity experts, industry, and government on how we can make these digital build files more secure.”