Brian Bradley
NS&D Monitor
12/12/2014
As tensions over the annexation of Crimea and occupation of Eastern Ukraine persist between the U.S. and Russia, the prospective advancement of further economic sanctions against Russia and potential placement of defensive weapons in Ukraine should have no impact on bilateral New START cooperation, according to Steven Pifer, former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and director of the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative. After a Dec. 9 presentation on the Budapest Memorandum at the Brookings Institution in Washington, Pifer told NS&D Monitor that as Washington and Moscow relations are at the “lowest point” since the Cold War, both sides individually recognize that New START continues to provide a high level of transparency whose value has risen in tandem with diplomatic tensions. “I think both Washington and Moscow concluded, in particular now, when you have greater tensions over Ukraine, that actually New START has more value than say it did maybe a year and a half ago, in that it provides a cap on strategic nuclear weapons and provides valuable transparency and predictability about each other,” Pifer said.
Will Ukraine Go Nuclear Again?
Responding to a reporter who asked the presenters whether Ukraine had the capability to resume its nuclear program, Robert Einhorn, a senior fellow with Brookings’ Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, said it was possible for Ukraine to restart its nuclear program, but added it was a question of time and cost. “Certainly, it’s possible,” Einhorn said. “But is it wise, is it affordable? That’s for Ukrainian leaders to consider.” Pifer cited a lofty price tag and lack of infrastructure as reasons for Ukraine’s discontinuation of its nuclear program. He said in the early 1990s, Ukraine had an infrastructure conducive to building ballistic missiles, but it would’ve cost billions to maintain other aspects of its nuclear capability.
Security Assurances and Nonproliferation
The U.S., Russia and United Kingdom have failed to provide security assurances to Ukraine stipulated by the Budapest Memorandum, and countries in the future will be less likely to accept “weak” security assurances as an alternative for nuclear weapons, Einhorn said during the presentation. In 1994, Ukraine agreed to accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and abandon its nuclear proliferation program in exchange for security assurances provided by the U.S., UK and Russia. In 1996, Ukraine became the first state to voluntarily abandon nuclear weapons. “In my view, the Budapest Memorandum experience will reduce the value of security assurances as a nonproliferation tool, but only the, in my view, relatively weak kind of assurances that were contained in the Budapest Memorandum,” Einhorn said.
