Brian Bradley
NS&D Monitor
09/04/2015
The Y-12 National Security Complex stayed on budget and on schedule in a $50 million project to replace an obsolete site security system with the more modern Argus system, according to an Aug. 28 Energy Department Inspector General’s Office report released on Wednesday. Completed in 2013, Y-12’s Security Improvements Project (SIP) also met all baseline benchmarks. However, the IG found that the National Nuclear Security Administration’s work scope and funding profile for the program did not address all implementation issues related to Argus. “As a result, while Y-12 spent more than $50 million to upgrade its physical security system, it had not met NNSA’s mandate to develop and implement a comprehensive method for managing and integrating the site’s security and access control systems,” the report states. Babcock & Wilcox was Y-12’s management contractor during the implementation of Argus.
Security has long been a major concern for Y-12, given the sensitive materials used in its nuclear-weapon work. The situation was highlighted in July 2012 when a nun and two other Transform Now Plowshares activists broke into the site by cutting through several security fences and defaced property (including the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility) with spray-painted messages and splashes of human blood. On Friday, the DOE IG stated in a separate report that a truck carrying clothes that contained samples of highly enriched uranium (HEU) was flagged last year upon trying to exit Y-12’s Protected Area.
Developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Argus is a highly interconnected, comprehensive digital security system that monitors and controls entry into high-security buildings, and can direct security forces to threats on property.
The IG found that Y-12 was using Argus to manage physical access to approximately 1 percent of the facility’s buildings, and the failure to integrate the system site-wide forced officials to rely on the older Identity Verification System to control access at the remaining areas. Furthermore, officials did not replace certain parts of the legacy system, including alarm wiring cabinets, and sensors. This spurred compatibility issues and increased the number of false or nuisance alarms that operators received, according to the IG.
Y-12 management had stated that no one raised these issues before the system was put into production, but the IG obtained evidence that concerns were raised “as early as June 2011,” approximately six months before the transition to Argus started. “In addition, the system owner was provided a list of almost 150 discrepancies in September 2011,” the report states. “One month later, the list had grown to almost 200 issues, 36 of which were deemed to be critical to the system’s functionality.” The report adds that issues brought to the project manager’s attention were deferred until after the transition was complete and the system was in production. After the start of the IG’s “test work,” remediation commenced for several Argus issues, yet about half of the “significant issues” were not resolved during the time of the IG’s review.
The IG issued three recommendations for security improvements by Y-12 management: (1) identify all critical security needs not addressed during Argus implementation, and then develop and fully follow through with comprehensive analyses, plans, schedules and budgets; (2) identify, assess and repair or replace all system components that contribute to high spurious or nuisance alarm rates; and (3) ensure appropriate dissemination and use of lessons learned.
In an Aug. 6 letter, NNSA Administrator Frank Klotz said the agency agreed with the auditors’ recommendations, “which are consistent with NNSA’s long standing strategy for Y-12.” The NNSA Production Office (NPO) is working with the agency’s Office of Defense Nuclear Security (NA-70) and the Security Center of Excellence to “identify, prioritize, and address the security needs of the Y-12 site within programmatic constraints,” the letter reads. NA-70 is coordinating with the NPO and the other NNSA sites to develop plans for the recapitalization of the weapons complex’s physical security systems, which will entail an initiation of a lifecycle replacement for all NNSA sites’ security systems, and a “systematic approach” to sustaining existing security systems, according to the note. Klotz stated the estimated completion date for the recapitalization plans is Sept. 30, 2016.
Klotz said that by Sept. 30, NNSA will review and consider the findings of the IG report for any future Argus installations. “Three lessons learned reports were produced and disseminated based on Y-12’s Argus installation,” Klotz stated. “Installation of future security systems will be informed by those lessons learned reports.”
