Brian Bradley
NS&D Monitor
7/24/2015
While the Los Alamos National Laboratory has addressed safety and quality assurance recommendations made in three reviews between 2010 and 2014, the lab has struggled to implement several safety requirements, resulting in lengthy program safety review and approval processes, according to an Energy Department Inspector General’s Office follow-up report released Tuesday. Lab contractor Los Alamos National Security (LANS) did not fully implement some safety protocols recommended in an August 2010 IG report titled “Nuclear Safety: Safety Basis and Quality Assurance at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.” LANS also did not completely address recommendations outlined in a May 2012 external corporate review and an October 2013 LANL Field Office assessment. Also, despite incurring respective $17 million and $9.9 million in safety basis expenditures between fiscal 2010 and 2013, the lab’s WETF and PF-4 facilities suffered from “multiple iterations” of major safety document revisions, according to the IG report released this week. As of February, major safety document revisions for the two facilities and the Radioassay and Nondestructive Testing (RANT) Facility remained incomplete.
“Safety basis documents did not meet NNSA’s expectations,” the report states. “We found that LANL had not effectively implemented its Safety Basis Improvement Plan, which was designed to enable LANL to build upon lessons learned and assessment findings. In addition, nuclear safety deficiencies were not always resolved because corrective actions were not effectively designed to prevent recurrence. In some instances, implementation was ineffective and there was no assurance that high risk issues had been adequately screened and identified to receive the proper one common safety basis document for its five nuclear environmental sites, for a total of nine safety basis documents.”
PF-4 Had ‘Significant’ Personnel Shortage
The IG stated that existing safety documentation issues could delay the restart of certain activities at critical facilities such as PF-4 and WETF. Furthermore, the report says that 2012 and 2013 assessments found that LANL lacked the nuclear criticality staff to implement key corrective safety actions at PF-4. This “significant” personnel shortage adversely impacted operations involving large quantities of fissile material. Assessors anticipated a three- to five-year delay in establishing a Nuclear Criticality Safety staff and a program capable of managing LANL’s work capacity. In tandem with the personnel shortage, PF-4 lacked criticality safety controls to prevent fissile materials, including plutonium, from causing a nuclear chain reaction, the report notes. LANL management agreed with the IG’s recommendations and indicated that corrective actions had started or been planned to address highlighted issues, according to the report. LANL did not respond to an NS&D Monitor request this week for comment on the report.
One example of a delayed LANL response to a Field Office safety recommendation was a 2013 instance in which the lab submitted the annual update on WETF to the office; although DOE provided comments in August of that year, LANL did not respond until April 2014. The Field Office then returned more recommendations and told LANL that approval of the response proposals would not be possible until all comments were resolved. The lab resubmitted responses in September 2014.
Because of persisting safety basis issues at WETF, the facility has been unable to process gas since July 2011. As of February 2015, LANL had not responded to 416 comments the Los Alamos Field Office issued two years earlier alongside a request for reply within 180 days, according to the report. A Field Office official told the DOE IG’s office that there were higher safety-related priorities, the report states.
Field Office Decision Reversal
The report also notes government delays, including that the Los Alamos Field Office rescinded its approval to convert RANT from a limited-life facility to an enduring facility after a December 2014 Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board report “identified issues with the RANT safety basis.” LANL submitted a seismic safety evaluation for Field Office approval in January 2015.
NNSA Response
LANS is reviewing program weaknesses, which the contractor hopes will yield more recommendations, NNSA Administrator Frank Klotz wrote in a June 29 response to the IG report. The review is expected to be complete by the end of this fiscal year. “Progress and accountability of LANS in deploying the requisite expertise to meet the plan requirements will be evaluated through: a) close monitoring of [Sustainable Buildings Implementation Plan] milestone status; b) tracking of functional management review corrective actions; and c) the annual Contractor Performance Evaluation Process (PEP),” Klotz’s letter states.
Klotz noted that the lab has taken several positive steps toward restarting PF-4 operations, too, including convening monthly resumption status meetings with LANS, and Los Alamos Field Office senior management to track schedule progress, LANS established a management review board to evaluate the readiness of all functional areas at the facility before starting the formal readiness review process, and changing LANS senior and mid-level management to change culture and, thereby, shore up systemic weaknesses.
“To its credit, LANL has taken several actions to address the criticality safety concerns,” the report states. “For example, corrective actions included revising the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program to strengthen line management ownership and responsibilities, performing quarterly internal assessments via metric review, and developing a detailed staffing plan. In addition, LANL performed a causal analysis of criticality safety infractions that occurred in 2013 and submitted a path forward plan to NNSA for reopening PF-4 for operations.”
The IG also recognized LANL and the National Nuclear Security Administration for addressing seismic risks and starting a quality assurance program approved by the Los Alamos Field Office. “To their credit, LANL and the [NNSA] took action to address seismic-related risks at LANL’s Plutonium Facility (PF-4), including installing significant structural upgrades, removing combustible material, and repackaging or disposing of plutonium,” the report states.
IG Recommendations
The IG recommended that to improve the implementation of nuclear safety requirements, Klotz should “take action to ensure that LANL” develops technical resources to meet the Safety Basis Improvement Plan requirements, continue to disseminate and apply lessons learned from previous safety basis reviews and submissions, and ensure implementation of corrective actions for long-standing issues that impact restart efforts at WETF and PF-4, “including addressing the shortage of experienced Criticality Safety Analysts to assess and correct nuclear criticality issues.”
