The Department of Energy is headed into overtime in preparing a plan to address emergency response vulnerabilities identified in the Pantex Plant’s ability to respond to the release of radioactive material or other crisis.
In a letter to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Chairman Joyce Connery, dated May 3 and posted later to the board’s website, Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz said his agency needs a 45-day extension to finish the draft implementation plan.
“DOE is working with your staff to define actions that will address the Recommendation, including the three sub-recommendations,” Moniz stated. “A draft implementation plan (IP) has been developed and shared with your staff. DOE is continuing to clarify the IP and its deliverables. We will also ensure there is a clear method for demonstrating closure of IP actions in a manner that can be easily verified.”
In a Dec. 3, 2015, notice published in the Federal Register, the DNFSB highlighted the dangers posed by an accident at the Texas panhandle nuclear warhead assembly and disassembly facility, which uses high explosives, chemicals, and radioactive substances in its operations. These included the release of dangerous radioactive materials into the environment in the event of a tornado, earthquake, or other natural disaster.
The report identified three primary weaknesses in the plant’s crisis management readiness:
- The Pantex Plant’s regimen of emergency drills and exercises has failed to show it is ready for a major crisis and has not sufficiently prepared personnel for an emergency response. Specifically, Pantex has not conducted a full-facility drill involving a radiological release since 2011.
- The site has not shown a capacity to provide the public with prompt, correct information regarding the consequences of the movement of radiological material beyond its property. Among various vulnerabilities, state radiological monitoring personnel must travel 500 miles from Austin to the Amarillo area in order to track radiological material, and the Pantex Plant itself cannot confirm its models of radioactive material releases without the state personnel.
- The facility’s emergency management technical planning basis and decision-making tools are not sufficient to prove readiness for “time sensitive events” and fail to account for the full scope of on-site dangers.
“The mission of the Pantex Plant is vital to our nation’s defense, and the consequences of a significant accident would be difficult to overcome,” the DNFSB said. “A robust, comprehensive, tested, and sustainable emergency preparedness and response capability is vital to ensure the adequate protection of the public health and safety during operational emergencies.”
The board offered a number of recommendations to address the Pantex Plant’s emergency preparedness vulnerabilities, including: establish a five-year schedule for Pantex Plant drills and exercises to fully show its capacity to deal with crises involving all possible hazards, including at least one site-wide exercise annually; ensure that state and local authorities receive prompt and accurate notification following the “off-site release of radioactive material”; and make multiple improvements to the site’s decision-making tools and notification methods.
Details of the draft DOE implementation plan, including its delivery date and the completion process, were not immediately known.
The Pantex Plant is overseen by DOE’s semiautonomous National Nuclear Security Administration and managed by Consolidated Nuclear Security (CNS), a consortium of Bechtel National, Lockheed Martin, Orbital ATK, and SOC. CNS referred questions to the Department of Energy, which declined to comment except to say that Moniz’s request for more time for his agency to complete the plan was not unusual in such circumstances. Additional DNFSB authorization is not needed for the extension.
