Enduring problems with hazard analysis and control at National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) sites require better contractor and federal oversight to improve workforce compliance with procedures, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Enterprise Assessments (EA) determined in a new review of work planning and control at six DOE sites.
Of those, EA reviewed operations and research at four NNSA sites: the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Nevada National Security Site, the Sandia National Laboratories, and the Y-12 National Security Complex. The assessment of contractor work planning and control focused on safety management functions such as defining a scope of work, identifying hazards and controls, and generally performing work safely. The report found established work planning and control programs at each DOE site EA reviewed, but identified issues that have been raised in reviews for the last eight years and not effectively addressed.
One of the weaknesses, the review found, was using the skill of workers for hazard control beyond the limits of their qualifications. For example, EA found at one of the sites a machine shop with no required training for workers to use equipment such as saws and grinders, and no operating manuals. The office also noted that assessments contractors are required to conduct to monitor worker exposure to safety hazards “were often incompletely or not properly based on the actual work being conducted” at several of the sites.
The report further found that hazard analysis was effective in identifying dangers presented by actual work activities, but ineffective in the event of abnormal conditions – specifically in case of low-probability, high-consequence events. For example, electrical wires located near an emergency shower could present a hazardous condition if the shower is activated during an emergency, the report said. In another instance, EA found researchers at a laboratory that, despite using a hazardous chemical properly, had not considered a potential spill when carrying the chemical across the laboratory and “were unsure of the response expected by the laboratory.”
The review said that despite these weaknesses, most work performed in the DOE complex results in fewer and “generally less severe” injuries than that of private industry. The exception, it said, is the DOE defense laboratories’ work, which results in injury and illness rates “comparable to or in a few cases higher” than the private industry’s research operations, potentially due to an “overreliance on skill of the researcher to analyze and control the hazards.”
EA also expressed concerned over “longstanding” contractor management problems in addressing its previous findings and incorrectly identifying the significance levels of incidents, as well as inadequate staffing levels at DOE field offices for effective oversight. The report recommended DOE field elements improve their oversight of contractor work planning and control and staffing levels. It recommended site contractors improve their work control processes for low-hazard activities, develop processes to identify unexpected hazards, and focus on ensuring compliance with hazard control procedures.
