Nuclear Security & Deterrence Monitor Vol. 23 No. 34
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Nuclear Security & Deterrence Monitor
Article 4 of 7
September 06, 2019

DNFSB Wants October Briefing on Y-12 Criticality Safety

By Chris Schneidmiller

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) hopes to receive a briefing in early October from the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) regarding criticality safety at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee.

Board member Joyce Connery, writing on behalf of DNFSB Chairman Bruce Hamilton, indicated in an Aug. 23 letter to NNSA Administrator Lisa Gordon-Hagerty that the board wanted to take her up on the offer of a briefing.

“As you offered, the Board would like a detailed briefing on actions taken to address the specific feedback from the external review of the Y-12 Criticality Safety Program,” Connery wrote. “Specifically, we request that the briefing focus on the roles and responsibilities of the federal staff in conducting oversight of nuclear criticality safety at Y-12, actions taken in light of the results of the external review, and NNSA’s expectations of its field office personnel in ensuring the safety of its federal and contractor workforce.”

In a July 24 letter to Hamilton, Gordon-Hagerty said the NNSA is “committed” to quickly answering information requests from the DNFSB. The NNSA Production Office at Y-12 had already provided documents following a March 14 board inquiry on criticality safety, which was followed by a June 5 request for additional information that the agency answered on July 1.

In a July 25 letter to Energy Secretary Rick Perry, Hamilton wrote that a DNFSB review identified a number of weaknesses in the program to prevent an unintended nuclear chain reaction at the NNSA’s primary uranium processing facility.

The three key findings, according to the board’s report: inadequate maintenance of Y-12’s criticality safety program; failure of operations personnel to participate, cooperate with, and take ownership of criticality safety at the site; and insufficient interface between Y-12’s criticality safety program and support programs. In a July report, the independent federal DNFSB cited “inadequate federal oversight” by the local NNSA office.

“Based on these three potential safety items, the staff has concluded that Y-12 has an inadequate CSP,” Hamilton wrote at the time.

Throughout 2017 and 2018, too much uranium accumulated unexpectedly in some uranium processing equipment at Y-12’s World War II-era Building 9212, the DNFSB has reported. The aging facility has also dealt with other criticality safety problems, such as the unexpected buildup of hydraulic fluid in 40-year-old mechanical systems and the discovery of excess uranium in old equipment.

Consolidated Nuclear Security, the NNSA’s management and operations prime for Y-12, has said uranium accumulations at the site did not pose any threat to personnel or the public. The contractor said it is taking aggressive steps to address nuclear criticality safety, including revising procedures, augmented oversight and training, and monitoring worker performance.

“[W]e are currently keeping an eye on the reaction by NNSA and the site to the in-depth staff report on Y-12 criticality safety programs that the Board sent to NNSA on July 25,” Richard Tontodonato, acting DNFSB deputy general manager, said by email Wednesday.

The DNFSB members are scheduled to be at Y-12 on Oct. 1 and 2, Connery wrote. They hope to receive the briefing at that point. The schedule has not been finalized yet, according to Tontodonato. He said the board specifically wants to meet with federal officials, rather than contractor personnel.

The independent federal DNSFB has oversight of active and former defense-nuclear sites, except for nuclear naval reactors facilities. The nominally five-member board has no regulatory power over DOE, which is its own nuclear regulator, but may make safety recommendations with which the secretary of energy must publicly agree or disagree.

The board is currently down to three members: Hamilton, Connery, and Jessie Hill Roberson. Daniel Santos, who had been the fourth member, abruptly resigned in March after the Donald Trump administration unveiled plans to reshape DNFSB membership: plans that did not include renominating Santos for another five year term.

The White House has nominated Thomas Summers, former vice commander of the U.S. Air Force 91st Missile Wing, and Lisa Vickers, a former Department of Energy site representative at the Pantex Plant, to fill the two empty DNFSB seats. The Senate, whose members are now gearing up in earnest for the 2020 general election, has yet to even grant the two a nomination hearing before its Armed Services Committee.

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