A new report from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) suggests the U.S. take a more involved approach to extended nuclear deterrence posture worldwide by broadening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) nuclear mission and developing nuclear-sharing arrangements in other regions.
According to the report, U.S. extended deterrence posture in Europe is highly institutionalized through a formal alliance of nuclear sharing with some NATO members; in the Asia-Pacific region the posture is moderately institutionalized; and in the Middle East the posture is “informal and ambiguous.” The nuclear-sharing agreement within NATO includes five countries – Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Turkey – that host U.S. B-61 gravity bombs that can be deployed by host military aircraft in case of war.
Challenges in Europe revolve around escalation management, the report says. “While NATO has been progressively reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War, Russia has more recently been moving in the exact opposite direction,” Evan Montgomery, a CSBA senior fellow and author of the report, said Tuesday at the report launch.
Montgomery cited Russia’s violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and its military exercises as examples of the country’s provocative actions.
“It also appears that Russian strategists now view low-yield nuclear weapons as a tool they can use to de-escalate a conflict, the idea being that a limited nuclear attack will cause opponents to back down,” Montgomery said, noting that “NATO has very few options to respond in kind.”
To deter the threat of a limited nuclear strike by Russia, the U.S. could incorporate more nations – specifically those most threatened by Russia, such as Poland – into NATO’s nuclear delivery mission, the report argues. Under this arrangement, the U.S. might give Poland dual-capable aircraft and access to forward-based B-61 bombs, it says.
Jakub Grygiel, senior associate professor of international relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, said at the event, “Russia has this dangerous belief that it . . . can engage in essentially a limited nuclear war to prevent NATO and the Western alliance from activating in case of a frontline conflict.” Russia’s “escalate to de-escalate” strategy stems from its assessment of “Western reluctance and fear” of nuclear weapons development, modernization, and use, he noted.
The report also highlights nonproliferation as a challenge in East Asia, as the North Korean nuclear arsenal and China’s conventional military modernization might prompt Japan and South Korea to consider acquiring their own nuclear weapons. In the Middle East, outside actors such as Pakistan or China might extend their nuclear umbrellas into the region to reassure the Gulf Arab countries that fear potential violations by Iran of its nuclear deal with world powers. This could cause vulnerable countries to “look for other patrons that will provide something that the United States cannot or will not, namely an explicit nuclear guarantee,” Montgomery said.
To address these issues, the report suggests the U.S. establish nuclear-sharing arrangements and nuclear planning groups in the Asia-Pacific and consider sea-basing nonstrategic nuclear weapons to defend allies in the Middle East. This might involve placing nuclear gravity bombs on carriers or nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on submarines, the report says.
