Chris Schneidmiller
WC Monitor
7/31/2015
Bechtel National in June agreed to pay $800,000 and take additional steps rather than face possible enforcement action by the Department of Energy over quality-assurance problems and other shortcomings in the contractor’s construction of the Hanford Site’s Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP).
The consent order between DOE and Bechtel followed a multiyear investigation by the department’s Office of Enterprise Assessments “into the facts and circumstances associated with the misalignment of design documents with [WTP] authorization bases; welding deficiencies of fabricated vessels accepted by WTP; and implementation of the quality assurance and corrective action management programs,” according to a June 1 letter from Steven Simonson, director of the Office of Enterprise Assessments’ Enforcement Office, to Margaret McCullough, Bechtel’s project director for WTP.
The effective date for the consent order was June 8, and the payment was due within 30 days of the order.
“Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI) and the Department of Energy have resolved these matters through an agreement under which BNI will complete a set of self-identified corrective actions that are well underway, and pay a monetary remedy of $800,000,” Bechtel spokesman Todd Nelson said by email on Thursday. “These matters were resolved through a consent order, which did not include a finding of violation, in consideration of BNI’s causal analyses and associated corrective actions taken since we first reported the issues. “
Resolving the situation “allows us to focus on what matters most: treating the radioactive waste as soon as possible,” Nelson added.
A DOE representative added: “The Department conducted a thorough investigation and determined it was appropriate to enter into a Consent Order and settlement agreement that includes continued implementation of corrective actions and requires the contractor to pay a monetary remedy of $800,000.”
When completed the WTP is intended to use vitrification technology to convert 56 million gallons of radioactive and chemical waste into a stable form that can be stored safely while the radioactivity dissipates over a period of hundreds to thousands of years.
The DOE probe identified faults with the more than decade-old preliminary documented safety analyses (PDSAs) for WTP facilities, which the consent order said are “intended to provide a reasonable basis for the preliminary conclusion that WTP can be operated safely.” However, Bechtel had not kept the PDSAs current, and some disparities between the analyses and actual plant design stretched for years. Such divergence could represent noncompliance with the department’s nuclear safety rules, according to DOE. It cited other possible areas of noncompliance by Bechtel, such as PDSA “hazards analyses” that were not completed or never undertaken.
The Department of Energy also highlighted multiple problems with welding of vessels provided by Bechtel subcontractors for the storage of radioactive waste, including acquisition and installation of containers that failed to satisfy quality assurance demands, contract mandates, or both. The “welding deficiencies appeared to be symptomatic of broader” problems with quality assurance and corrective action management, the consent order says.
DOE found that Bechtel’s QA and CAM management plans have “not been implemented in accordance with requirements” and are thus “not fully effective.” Officials from the DOE Office of River Protection, which is overseeing work on the WTP, “identified weaknesses in design control, software quality assurance, procurement document control, control of purchased items and services, identification and control of items, and corrective action,” the consent order says. Bechtel conducted two analyses of its own, which found deficiencies in training, oversight, and senior-level support, among other areas, in the CAM program, along with insufficient oversight, resources, and workforce know-how among the problems plaguing quality assurance.
Along with the $800,000 payment, Bechtel agreed to carry out a number of improvements under the terms of the consent order. These included making mandatory corrections to the quality assurance program by Sept. 30 of this year; delivering within nine months the findings of its assessment of welds and weld documentation, including details of efforts to fix the problems; and correction of corrective action management deficiencies by Oct. 31, 2015.
DOE said it retained the right to reopen the investigation and take further action should it identify “any false or materially inaccurate facts or information” from Bechtel , any recurrence of the noted “nuclear safety deficiencies,” or if the contractor fails to follow through on the measures it pledged to prevent deal with the issues cited in the consent order.
