Nuclear Security & Deterrence Vol. 18 No. 37
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Nuclear Security & Deterrence Monitor
Article 18 of 19
September 26, 2014

At Oak Ridge

By Kenny Fletcher

Deinventory of Y-12 Area 5 Underway

NS&D Monitor
9/26/2014

The National Nuclear Security Administration has acknowledged that activities underway to reduce the inventory of highly enriched uranium inside production facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex are part of the response to the Red Team report released earlier this year. “The de-inventory of Area 5 at Y-12 was one of the key recommendations of the Red Team report,” Steven Wyatt, a spokesman in the NNSA Production Office, said in response to questions. “This effort will have the goal of reducing the amount of enriched uranium to as low as possible for what is required for production purposes to reduce risks.”

Area 5 includes the main 9212 uranium-processing facility at Y-12, but the NNSA refused to be specific in defining the parameters of the production area. “The term itself is not widely used,” Wyatt said, although it’s referenced in at least several instances in the Y-12 10-Year Site Plan. Wyatt also would not respond directly to NNSA plans to locate alternative uranium processing operations—notably the “electro-refining” and the “calciner” technologies—to Building 9215 adjacent to 9212. Wyatt said decisions “regarding the deployment” of those technologies have not been completed at this time.

According to information in the site plan through FY 2023, it would appear that efforts were already underway to reduce the enriched uranium in Area 5. Indeed, it was cited as an accomplishment. “Deinventory continued of Area 5; material was moved from Buildings 9212, 9215, and 9204 into HEUMF (Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility),” the site plan stated.

Other Efforts to Consolidate Production at Y-12 Underway

Meanwhile, the report cited other efforts to consolidate the production work at the Oak Ridge plant. “A number of ‘enduring facilities’ must remain operational throughout the long-term horizon,” the report said. “A facility’s categorization as enduring is a factor in the prioritization of repairs and maintenance. Facility assessments, facility risk reduction initiatives, DM analyses, and funding prioritization ensure these facilities will continue to operate. While buildings like 9212 are not considered enduring, the critical nature of their function demands appropriate risk reduction.”

The report said that since the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facilities became operational four years ago, all canned subassemblies from long-term storage areas—“with the exception of a small working inventory”—have been relocated to the HEUMF. “Now the focus is on the movement of EU (enriched uranium) materials from interim and in-process storage into HEUMF,” the 10-Year Site Plan noted. “The deinventory of EU materials from interim and in-process storage is managed by the Area 5 Deinventory Program. The Area 5 Deinventory Program’s priority is the deinventory of the interim and in-process storage areas during this timeframe to facilitate the closure of Building 9212 and the transition to UPF. In many cases, the materials in the interim and in-process storage areas will require some type of processing to meet long-term storage requirements. Canned subassemblies awaiting dismantlement will continue to be stored at their current locations.”

Y-12 Gets High Marks for Security Review

NS&D Monitor
9/26/2014

According to top-level security managers at the Y-12 National Security Complex, a weeks-long inspection by DOE headquarters found “notable progress” in the plant’s security program—compared to previous security reviews—and noted that the protective force was “fully capable.” Arnold Guevara, safeguards and security manager in the NNSA Production Office; and Ken Freeman, the head of Safeguards, Security, and Emergency Services for Bechtel-led Consolidated Nuclear Security, reported the summary results of the inspection in a message to Y-12 employees. “Overall results indicate that notable progress has been made since the last headquarters inspection,” Guevara and Freeman said in the message. “The Y?12 protective force was also determined to be fully capable, and the inspection complimented their knowledge, skills, and ability to perform the primary protective mission. As expected the inspection noted areas for improvement, and we will use the feedback to continue building on the progress we have achieved.”

The federal and contractor officials offered thanks to the people who supported the Y-12 security inspection. “Our protective forces performed admirably while demonstrating a high degree of professionalism, esprit de corps, and excellence in mission execution,” they stated. “Of course, security goes beyond just our protective forces. As one of our five shared absolutes, security is a responsibility that we all share. Thank you for all you do to protect our sites, the information and materials we are entrusted with, and the people of this great nation who rely upon us.”

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Table of Contents
  1. By Martin Schneider
  2. By Todd Jacobson
  3. By Kenny Fletcher
  4. By Kenny Fletcher
  5. By Kenny Fletcher
  6. By Kenny Fletcher
  7. By Kenny Fletcher
  8. By Kenny Fletcher
  9. By Kenny Fletcher
  10. By Kenny Fletcher
  11. By Kenny Fletcher
  12. By Kenny Fletcher
  13. By Kenny Fletcher
  14. By Kenny Fletcher
  15. By Kenny Fletcher
  16. By Kenny Fletcher
  17. By Kenny Fletcher
  18. By Kenny Fletcher
  19. By Kenny Fletcher
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NEW: Via public records request, I’ve been able to confirm reporting today that a warrant has been issued for DOE deputy asst. secretary of spent fuel and waste disposition Sam Brinton for another luggage theft, this time at Las Vegas’s Harry Reid airport. (cc: @EMPublications)

DOE spent fuel lead Brinton accused of second luggage theft.



by @BenjaminSWeiss, confirming today's reports with warrant from Las Vegas Metro PD.

Waste has been Emplaced! 🚮

We have finally begun emplacing defense-related transuranic (TRU) waste in Panel 8 of #WIPP.

Read more about the waste emplacement here: https://wipp.energy.gov/wipp_news_20221123-2.asp

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