Alissa Tabirian
NS&D Monitor
7/17/2015
The United States should unilaterally reduce its nuclear arsenal without fear of Russia’s nuclear modernization program, according to Greg Thielmann, Senior Fellow at the Arms Control Association. "I also disagree with those . . . who say we cannot now risk much deeper cuts in our current nuclear arsenals," Thielmann said this week at a Hoover Institution panel discussion.
Speaking to NS&D Monitor after the event, Thielmann recalled President Barack Obama’s 2013 remarks in Berlin, where he said the United States "can ensure the security of America and our allies, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third" beyond New START treaty levels. According to Thielmann, "that was really an extraordinary statement" because it implied "that no matter what the Russians do, there’s a certain number of operationally deployed warheads above which additional warheads have no utility." In addition to asking Russia "to join in a negotiated lowering of the limits," Thielmann said the United States could "unilaterally remove some of our weapons to get down to the lower level the Russians are at right now" and "put the onus on them to raise the numbers." According to a March 1 data exchange, the United States had 1,597 warheads on 785 deployed strategic weapons, while Russia had 1,582 warheads on 515 deployed weapons.
Thielmann identified many of the ongoing warnings about Russia’s nuclear modernization program as "crazy talk" that "[feeds] into Putin’s narrative where he is mostly trying to convince his own people that he’s the tough guy and he’s not going to let Russia be pushed around." Thielmann said the United States "should have had a big shrug of the shoulders" upon learning last month that Putin intends to add 40 new intercontinental ballistic missiles to Russia’s arsenal this year.
"Russia is retiring dozens of potent but old missiles from the Cold War," Thielmann said, noting that this means there will be "no increase in their overall arsenal as a result of these 40 new missiles." He added that both the United States and Russia are “planning on stocking their arsenals right up to the New START limits,” but that this is “not really necessary.” Both countries, he said, "are committed to the New START limits" despite the rhetoric, "so a lot of this is just hyperventilating unnecessarily."
Des Browne, British Labor Party politician and Vice Chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, said during the panel that the institutions meant to foster “constructive interaction between the West and Russia are inadequate or incapable of addressing” current security issues. Michael Mazarr, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, argued that traditional methods of arms control are not as effective as they once were. He suggested “a process of confidence-building and risk-reduction, beginning with the United States and Russia” as a means of enhancing nuclear security worldwide. Mazarr said the two countries “have a long history of confidence-building measures” and should consider implementing “launch verification technologies,” “enhanced notification of exercises,” and “military-to-military ties.”
IAEA’s Role in Nonproliferation
Panelists at the event also recognized the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in international nonproliferation efforts, but questioned the organization’s ability to serve as a nuclear watchdog due to its limited resources. Thielmann spoke in favor of a “greater emphasis globally on multilateralizing the nuclear fuel process,” noting Kazakhstan’s role in hosting an international fuel bank to ensure a reliable fuel supply and deter nations from developing fuel capabilities that could be used in nuclear-weapon development. The initiative, authorized in 2010, creates an international bank of low-enriched uranium fuel to be provided to countries that need it for their own nuclear power reactors. Browne agreed that the fuel bank initiative will help “break the inevitable link between civil nuclear power and the potential breakout to nuclear weapons,” specifically because the bank’s nuclear fuel assurances are meant to prevent nations from pursuing their own enrichment technology.
