An anti-nuclear advocate and adviser to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission warned officials on Tuesday not to make the same mistake as the Japanese in letting industry overpower the regulator.
A Japanese parliamentary panel in 2012 found that the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant disaster the year before was profoundly man-made and a result of “regulatory capture,” a theory in which industry controls regulatory guidance. The 641-page report concluded that collusion between the government, regulator, and utilities meant Japan was not safe from nuclear accidents, and therefore the disaster was man-made even though it began with an earthquake and tsunami.
Paul Gunter, director of Beyond Nuclear’s Reactor Oversight Project, told NRC commissioners on Tuesday to think twice about issuing regulatory waivers to owners of soon-to-be-shutdown nuclear plants. Gunter appeared on a panel of experts before the commission during a status update for NRC’s Japan Lessons Learned initiative.
Gunter cited NRC’s 2015 decision to grant an “extension to comply” to Exelon, owner of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station in New Jersey, which is set to close in December 2019. With the exemption, Exelon can avoid installing a severe accident capable hardened containment vent. Oyster Creek, the country’s oldest operational nuclear power plant, has the same Mark I boiling water reactor design as Fukushima. Gunter said Beyond Nuclear’ worries the NRC needs to hold the line on the orders it issues.
“The combination of willful negligence, the collusion of government, regulator, industry to advance corporate production and financial agendas over public safety, and regulatory deferral of enforceable standards to voluntary industry initiatives adds up to a recipe for the next disaster,” Gunter said.
Entergy recently submitted a request for an extension to comply with event mitigation strategies and spent fuel instrumentation orders at its James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant in New York.
Commissioner Jeff Baran asked the panel how NRC should weigh this and future requests. He questioned how the regulator should weigh the benefit and cost of implementing additional safety measures when a plant may shut down shortly after.
Gunter replied that NRC should not allow refueling if it approves an exemption, saying he doesn’t think it’s reasonable to “extend that kind of undue risk to public health and safety.” Oyster Creek had planned two additional refueling cycles after accepting the exemption. Gunter also raised concerns about the lack of a public hearing in the exemption process.
In discussing the issue with his staff, Baran said allowing public hearings for future requests is something to consider. NRC Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs and Fukushima Steering Committee Chairman Michael Johnson said there is already a high level of stakeholder input in the regulatory process, which allows individuals to request NRC action. He said he’s comfortable with the current process, but staff can provide “additional visibility” if there are concerns.
Also during the panel, Anthony Pietrangelo, chief nuclear officer for industry group the Nuclear Energy Institute, provided a status update on implementation of NRC’s “flex” equipment, which is said to be the cornerstone of the regulator’s Japan initiative.
The flexible cooling equipment consists of a standard set of emergency-response vehicles, water pumps, motors, and generators meant to address one of the most critical Fukushima failures: a lack of reactor cooling capabilities in dealing with prolonged losses of power. At Fukushima workers improvised by injecting cooling water into the reactor cores and spent fuel pools, but they were unsuccessful and could not prevent the three core meltdowns, which led to three hydrogen blasts.
Of the 100 American nuclear reactors, 58 units have successfully completed flex gear installation, and 13 completed installation with the exception of severe-accident capable vents. The remaining 29 are expected to finish the work by fall 2016.
Pietrangelo said the industry is well on its way, but much work remains.
“There’s still a lot of work to do with the mitigating strategy assessment, and some of the reevaluated hazard work,” Pietrangelo said. “Still work to do in particular on the inspection process. We are committed to maintaining the focus on our equipment and the safety enhancements going forward.”
