Kenneth Fletcher
WC Monitor
3/21/2014
Following an investigation that concluded that last month’s fire at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant was “preventable,” URS is bringing in another addition to WIPP’s management team to focus on the facility’s recovery, WC Monitor has learned. URS has hired Perma-Fix Environmental Services Chief Operating Officer Jim Blankenhorn to fill the newly created position of Recovery Manager at URS-led Nuclear Waste Partnership, LLC, the managing contractor for WIPP. This comes after last week URS brought in Bob McQuinn as NWP’s new president and project manager, demoting former NWP head Farok Sharif to project manager of the TRU Waste Program.
Blankenhorn previously held a variety of senior management positions with URS, including deputy project manager for West Valley Environmental Services, LLC, before being hired by Perma-Fix in 2011. “URS is hiring Jim Blankenhorn for a key position in the DOE complex, pending DOE approval,” URS spokesman Keith Wood said this week, declining to comment further. Perma-Fix declined to comment.
Accident Investigation Finds Fire Preventable
The decision comes on the heels of an accident investigation report released late last week that detailed numerous issues, including a lack of proper maintenance and an inadequate response, that contributed to the Feb. 5 salt truck fire in WIPP’s underground. Less than two weeks after the fire, the facility experienced a radiation release and so far there has been no manned re-entry to the mine or confirmation of the source of the release. The fire most likely started when a buildup of flammable fluids on the truck, such as diesel fuel or hydraulic fluid, came in contact with a hot surface such as the catalytic convertor, the Accident Investigation Board found. However, the root cause of the accident was a failure by NWP “to adequately recognize and mitigate the hazard regarding a fire in the underground,” the report states. “This includes recognition and removal of the buildup of combustibles through inspections, and periodic preventative maintenance, e.g., cleaning and the decision to deactivate the automatic onboard fire suppression system.”
Fire Suppression System Deactivated
The 29-year-old truck’s automatic fire suppression system was deactivated in 2003, after “numerous inadvertent activations, including some which occurred while the vehicle was parked and not running,” the report states. The truck’s operator first tried to put out the fire unsuccessfully with an extinguisher. When that failed, he activated the truck’s manual suppression system, which also did not put out the fire. “The training and qualification of the operator was inadequate to ensure proper response to a vehicle fire. He did not initially notify the [Central Monitoring Room] that there was a fire or describe the fire’s location,” according to the report. “The CMR response to the fire, including evaluation and protective actions, was less than adequate.”
‘Workers Reported Near Collisions’
The report paints a chaotic scene in the underground the hour following the discovery of the fire. “Some workers encountered difficulties (heavy smoke, strobes not on or not working, smoke in areas expected to have ‘good’ air, obscured evacuation reflectors) and improvised routes to the waste hoist, at times cutting holes in ventilation curtains. Workers reported near-collisions between personnel, carts, and other equipment,” the report states. Some of the numerous issues with the response include garbled announcements, a lack of information to workers about the fire’s location, and no evacuation strobe lights and alarm.
‘Lack of Effective Drills and Training’
Additionally, the facility shift manager decided to change the mine’s ventilation to filtration mode, which is not a standard response for a fire and caused “significant changes in air flow and smoke,”the report states. Because filtration is associated with a radiation release, it caused an “increase in anxiety” among workers. “The Board determined that there was a lack of effective drills and training, there was complexity of the alarm and communication system, and there were additional burdens placed on the [facility shift manager] due to the lack of a structured Incident Command System,” the report states. “The Board also determined that the poor housekeeping observed throughout the mine had a negative impact on the ability of workers to navigate to the egress point in the reduced visibility environment.” Out of 86 workers in the underground, 13 were treated and six were sent to the hospital for smoke inhalation.
NWP to Address Recommendations
The aging truck was also not maintained as recommended by its service manual. For example, instead of washing it periodically it was cleaned with compressed air. Fluid leaks were also not documented in the operator’s checklist. NWP said it is addressing issues uncovered by the investigation. “We will commence our review process immediately and will promptly address all of [Accident Investigation Board’s] recommendations with an eye towards protecting worker health, public health and the environment,” NWP spokesman Donavan Mager said in a statement. “Our team is working closely with the U.S. Department of Energy to execute our Integrated Recovery Plan, restore operations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and resume waste disposal operations in a safe, systematic manner.”
Congressional Delegation Concerned
Members of New Mexico’s Congressional delegation expressed concern over the report’s conclusions. “The findings of the accident investigation board on the February 5th fire at WIPP are deeply concerning,” Sens. Martin Heinrich (D) and Tom Udall (D) said in a statement. “Fortunately, no one was hurt. The community of Carlsbad and the nation expect WIPP to operate with the highest level of safety. The board has identified a number of serious safety concerns that will need to be fully addressed. We believe all levels of management at the Department of Energy and at WIPP must take the recommendations from the board very seriously and fully implement them.”
Rep. Steve Pearce (R-N.M.) said in a statement: “This transparent report highlights the sloppy procedures that caused the fire. … I applaud the Department of Energy for producing a candid, transparent report that takes responsibility for its failures in oversight, training and other areas crucial to the operation of WIPP. This report shows operational shortcomings, and highlights what the Department and contractor must do to rectify the situation. New Mexicans expect and deserve to know the full truth. Fortunately, no one was seriously hurt, but it must never happen again.”
Another ‘Very Small’ Release of Radiation Detected
Also this week, DOE announced that air sampling data indicates that on March 11 a “very small” release occurred that is likely a result of the original release in mid-February. “This is expected given the amount of contamination captured by the WIPP ventilation system during the February 14 radiation release event. Engineers believe the contamination was from previous deposits on the inner surface of the exhaust ductwork,” states a DOE release. DOE also announced that it will begin tests to see if the site’s high efficiency particulate air filters are operating at “peak performance,” and may decide to replace the filters. Last week the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board warned that additional releases were possible at WIPP because the repository’s ventilation system is not a “credited safety system.” DOE did not respond to request for comment about the additional release this week.
Preparations Underway For Manned Reentry
DOE is also preparing for sending personnel back into the mine, including conducting a safety evaluation of a manned re-entry plan that has been submitted to DOE. Additionally this week, about 20 members of the mine re-entry team performed a trial run at a nearby potash mine. “The underground training at the Potash Mine allowed the team to test equipment and their ability to walk long distances in protective wear,” according to a DOE release. “Once the plan is approved, personnel will ride the salt hoist and air intake shaft hoist conveyances to the bottom and back while performing the Mine Safety and Health Administration-required shaft inspections. A second entry will follow with the re-entry team establishing conditions from the salt hoist underground to the air intake shaft to ensure a safe secondary exit path.”
